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“We the People,” Constitutional Accountability, and 
Outsourcing Government 
KIMBERLY N. BROWN* 
The ubiquitous outsourcing of federal functions to private contractors, although 
benign in the main, raises the most fundamental of constitutional questions: What 
institutions and actors comprise the “federal government” itself? From Abu 
Ghraib to Blackwater, a string of scandals has heightened public awareness that 
highly sensitive federal powers and responsibilities are routinely entrusted to 
government contractors. At the same time, the American populace seems vaguely 
aware that, when it comes to ensuring accountability for errors and abuses of 
power, contractors occupy a special space. The fact is that myriad structural and 
procedural means for holding traditionally government actors accountable do not 
apply to private contractors exercising identical powers. This accountability 
vacuum is not remedied by prevailing constitutional doctrine, which ignores the 
realities of modern government by drawing an artificial line between the public 
and private spheres. I have thus argued previously that all private contractors 
should be viewed as anatomically related to other quasi-government entities such 
as independent agencies, residing along a single continuum of constitutional 
accountability. This Article builds on that premise by positing that private-public 
relationships be structured to ensure accountability as a matter of constitutional 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to picture the following. Federal agency “A” contracts with private 
corporation “B” for goods or services that the government would normally provide. 
Corp. B’s job is a mundane one. It provides linens to a veterans’ hospital and does 
so without incident. Few members of the public care enough to monitor Corp. B or 
its relationship with the federal government. The scenario remains in obscurity. But 
imagine instead a very different contract. Corp. B is given a substantial role in the 
administration of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement with another country.1 It 
involves big dollars and the exercise of real discretion. Serious problems arise in 
the execution of the contract. Press coverage is extensive. Politicians run for cover. 
Corp. B becomes infamous, prompting resounding cries for reform—but of what 
kind? 
The latter narrative has become a staple of popular culture, and law scholars 
have puzzled greatly over what to do about it. Private contractors engaged in 
interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison that included sexual assault, beatings, and the 
deprivation of food and water.2 Halliburton was hastily awarded multibillion dollar 
contracts for nation building and military logistical support in Iraq, and wound up 
facing numerous allegations of fraud, overcharging, kickbacks,3 and criminal 
liability.4 Hired to provide security in Iraq and Afghanistan, Blackwater personnel 
were charged with killing seventeen civilians in Baghdad.5 Such high-profile cases 
have prompted civil lawsuits, congressional investigations, and criminal liability. 
Yet no systemic legal framework governs the federal government’s decisions to 
outsource in the first place. President Obama has sought to “‘in-source’ defense-
related jobs”6 in reaction to former President Bush’s massive outsourcing 
initiative.7 All this shows, however, is that the government’s overall approach to 
federal contracting remains ad hoc and politically vulnerable. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts 
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1001 
(2005) (discussing such a contract entailing an agreement with Russia under the Clinton 
administration). 
 2. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2011); see also 
Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the C.I.A. Legally Kill a Prisoner?, THE NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/11/14/051114fa_fact?
currentPage=all. 
 3. See Abigal H. Avery, Comment, Weapons of Mass Construction: The Potential 
Liability of Halliburton Under the False Claims Act and the Implications to Defense 
Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REV. 827, 837–38 (2006). 
 4. See Charles R. Babcock, Ex-KBR Worker Tied to Iraq Contract Fraud, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45442-2005Mar17.html. 
 5. See David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without 
Cause, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/
14blackwater/html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 6. Matthew Potter, Small Businesses Are Starting to Organize Against Federal 
“Insourcing” of Contractor Jobs, CBS NEWS (May 12, 2010, 5:45 AM), http://www.bnet.
com/blog/government/small-businesses-are-starting-to-organize-against-federal-insourcing-
of-contractor-jobs/6471. 
 7. See Kevin P. Stiens & Susan L. Turley, Uncontracting: The Move Back to 
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Many of the myriad structural and procedural means for holding government 
actors accountable simply do not apply to private contractors exercising identical 
powers. This accountability vacuum is not remedied by prevailing constitutional 
doctrine, which ignores the realities of modern government by drawing an artificial 
line between the public and private spheres. In short, no constitutional actor—not 
the Supreme Court, Congress, or the President—is minding the constitutional store 
to protect against the kinds of systematic abuses by private actors holding federal 
power that the Constitution was structurally designed to avoid.8 When Congress 
diverted prosecutorial powers to an independent branch of government, Justice 
Scalia warned that “an issue of this sort will come . . . clad, so to speak in sheep’s 
clothing,” with the potential “to effect important change in the equilibrium of 
power [that] is not immediately evident.”9 Privatization is similarly redefining 
federal government as we know it without robust constitutional dialogue. 
By contrast, the Constitution has featured heavily in the many legal debates over 
whether independent agencies are structurally sound and, more generally, whether 
redistribution of constitutional power in any form is proper. When Congress crafted 
a new federal agency to regulate the accounting industry after the Enron debacle, 
for example, its legislation faced sharp—and successful—constitutional attack10 for 
failing to render the agency sufficiently accountable to the President. When the 
Amtrak Corporation was created to further federal objectives, the Supreme Court 
declared it a part of the government for purposes of the First Amendment, 
notwithstanding legislative language to the contrary.11 These kinds of precedents 
should drive the discussion of how to manage and render accountable private 
contractors, as well. 
This Article urges recognition of a constitutional accountability doctrine that 
would operate to tether the exercise of federal power to the people themselves. It 
does so by deriving substance from the procedural framework of the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                 
Performing In-House, 65 A.F. L. REV. 145, 159–60 (2010) (discussing the Bush 
Administration’s goal of “competitive sourcing”). 
 8. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1507, 1510 (2001) (“[F]ederal constitutional law has little, if anything, to say about 
a decision to contract with private entities for provision of public services, such as police and 
fire protection, operation of jails and prisons, street cleaning, garbage collection, inspectional 
services, and maintenance of public parks and buildings. There is no general federal anti-
privatization doctrine requiring that particular government activities, state or federal, be 
conducted only by traditional government employees.”). 
 9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988); see also Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting in dissent from decision upholding 
United States Sentencing Commission that “I foresee all manner of ‘expert’ bodies, insulated 
from the political process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking 
responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with 
perhaps a few Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, ‘no-win’ political 
issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of 
fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set—not because of the 
scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of 
Government”). 
 10. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 
(2010). 
 11. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). 
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Because the Constitution assumes that the ultimate source of all federal power is 
the people, anyone who exercises the people’s power must be structurally 
accountable to the people. Acknowledging that the Constitution requires 
accountability for the exercise of the power of the people is a first step towards 
identifying constitutional boundaries around the practice of privatized government. 
The Article then gives some definition to constitutional accountability and what it 
might mean in practice. 
Part I identifies the problem: an accountability imbalance between public actors 
and private contractors exercising similar powers. To give a sense of the issue’s 
scope, this Part describes three examples of federal contracting—a McDonald’s 
restaurant at the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum, the outsourcing of special 
military operations to the Blackwater Corporation, and the privatization of airport 
security by the Transportation and Safety Administration (TSA)—and reviews the 
barriers to holding contractors accountable that exist under current constitutional 
and administrative law. 
Deriving substance from the Constitution’s procedural structure, Parts II and III 
identify and apply the foundations and characteristics of a constitutional 
accountability doctrine. Because the Constitution is a mere conduit for the people’s 
power, that power does not magically lose its constitutional character when it is 
contractually delegated to private parties. Thus, the federal government cannot 
outsource its powers without putting mechanisms in place for rendering contractors 
accountable to the people and to the President. Part II outlines five particular 
characteristics of constitutional accountability, and Part III revisits the scenarios 
introduced in Part I as a platform for developing a preliminary doctrinal framework 
for applying a constitutional accountability principle to outsourcing. 
I. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM OF PRIVATIZED GOVERNMENT 
“Accountability” connotes a range of meanings. A common dictionary 
definition associates accountability with being answerable, explainable, and 
“subject to giving an account” or reckoning for one’s actions.12 Scholars have 
similarly identified “the original or core sense of ‘accountability’” as that which is 
“associated with the process of being called ‘to account’ to some authority for 
one’s actions.”13 This mainstay conception of accountability has been refined to 
encompass dual features: 
[I]t is external, in that the account is given to some other person or 
body outside the person or body being held accountable; [and] it 
involves social interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling 
for the account, seeks answers and rectification while the other side, 
that being held accountable, responds and accepts sanctions.14 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 50 (1981). 
 13. See Richard Mulgan, “Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. 
ADMIN. 555 (2000). 
 14. Id. at 555 (emphasis in original). Professor Mulgan adds a third element—the right 
to impose sanctions—but then notes that this “may appear to go beyond the notion of ‘giving 
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In the democratic context, a variant of core accountability takes shape. For 
government actors, “the key accountability relationships . . . are those between the 
citizens and the holders of public office and, within the ranks of office holders, 
between elected politicians and bureaucrats.”15 As Part II explains, the fundamental 
role of the people under the structural Constitution gives substantive meaning to the 
idea of democratic accountability that distinguishes it from accountability in the 
more generic sense. 
Inevitably, democratic accountability is compromised with the practice of 
government outsourcing, which occurs when the government contracts with private 
parties to provide goods or services for which the government is responsible.16 As a 
result of hiring caps on federal employees, a desire for flexibility and short-term 
“surge capacity,” and a lack of in-house expertise,17 the practice has become 
widespread within the federal government. From 2000–2013, the federal 
government paid over $5.469 trillion to private contractors.18 Private contractors 
now perform a broad range of functions for the federal government, including 
formulating federal policy, interpreting laws, administering foreign aid, managing 
nuclear weapons sites and intelligence operations, interrogating detainees, 
controlling borders, designing surveillance systems, and providing military support 
in combat zones.19 Under these circumstances, contract terms—and not the 
                                                                                                                 
an account.’” Id. at 556. 
 15. Id. Richard Mulgan adds that public accountability further encompasses 
the sense of individual responsibility and concern for the public interest 
expected from public servants[,] . . . the various institutional checks and 
balances by which democracies seek to control the actions of 
governments[,] . . . the extent to which governments pursue the wishes or needs 
of their citizens . . . regardless of whether they are induced to do so through 
processes of authoritative exchange and control[,] . . . [and] the public 
discussion between citizens on which democracies depend. 
Id. 
 16. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1525; Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: 
Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 113–
17 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecutions?: The Limits of 
Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266. This Article does not 
address other related forms of privatization, such as deregulation of personal relations 
(including marriage), deregulation of markets, regulatory moves toward performance 
standards and other cooperative strategies, vouchers, tax reductions, user fees, and the 
creation of government corporations. See generally Beermann, supra note 8, at 1529–53. 
 17. ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL TO 
THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 393 
(2007) [hereinafter AAP REPORT]. The AAP Report was statutorily commissioned to 
“review[] laws, regulations, and government-wide acquisition policies ‘regarding the use of 
commercial practices, performance-based contracting, the performance of acquisition 
functions across agency lines of responsibility, and the use of Government-wide contracts.’” 
Id. at ix (quoting Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1663 (2003)). 
 18. See Total Federal Spending, USA SPENDING, http://www.usaspending.gov/
trends?trendreport=default&viewreport=yes&maj_contracting_agency_t=&pop_state_t=&p
op_cd_t=&vendor_state_t=&vendor_cd_t=&psc_cat_t=&tab=Graph+View&Go.x=Go 
(reflecting data reported by agencies up until May 10, 2013). 
 19. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 138 
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relational hierarchies that exist within a government bureaucracy and constitutional 
democracy—govern contractor performance. To the extent that democratic 
accountability is defined in part by the structures and procedures that are put in 
place for federal actors, it suffers when private parties are routinely hired to do 
things that federal actors would otherwise do. This is so even if accountability in 
the basic sense of holding one to account to an authority is addressed by contractual 
terms. 
To put the problem in context, this Part describes three federal contracting 
examples that characterize the range of public functions at stake in the outsourcing 
context—from the mundane to the highly sensitive—with an eye toward revisiting 
each after the foundations and characteristics of the constitutional accountability 
requirement are established. It then walks through the existing legal means of 
holding private contractors accountable for the misuse of federal powers and 
observes, as others have, that federal employees exercising identical powers are 
subject to more scrutiny and mechanisms for establishing democratic accountability 
than are their private counterparts. Importantly, there is no constitutional doctrine 
for identifying and enforcing boundaries on the outsourcing of federal powers in 
the first place. Because the private delegation and state action doctrines have failed 
to serve this important function, an alternative constitutional theory is needed. 
A. Three Federal Contracting Variants 
This subpart introduces three modern contracting scenarios—McDonald’s at the 
Air and Space Museum, Blackwater in the military theatre, and the outsourcing of 
airport security responsibilities by TSA—as foils for exploring what public 
accountability means, a concept that is constitutionally moored yet marginalized 
under the modern regime of ad hoc and inconsistent federal contracting policy. 
1. McDonald’s at the Smithsonian 
The federal government enters into thousands of contracts for routine goods and 
services each year.20 Over nine million people visit the Smithsonian’s Air and 
Space Museum annually, and many of them go to the McDonald’s restaurant 
                                                                                                                 
(2005) (discussing the privatization of foreign affairs); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (2000) (discussing the pervasiveness of 
private actors in “regulation, service provision, policy design, and implementation”); 
William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting the 
National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 WIDENER L. 
REV. 491, 498–503 (2006) (describing the outsourcing of the “Response Plan” in greater 
detail); Griff Witte & Charles R. Babcock, A Major Test for FEMA and Its Contracting 
Crew, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (reporting that the Department of Homeland 
Security first outsourced to the Rand Corporation the creation of a national emergency 
“Response Plan” before the work was eventually reassigned to the federal government). 
 20. See Selling to the Federal Government, PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
CENTER, http://www.sbtdc.org/programs/ptac/selling-to-fed-government (describing the 
thousands of government contracts that are available to businesses); see also U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 2, available at http://archive.sba.gov/idc/
groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/serv_pub_contracting.pdf (describing the U.S. 
government as the world’s largest buyer of goods and services). 
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there.21 As a matter of public accountability, McDonald’s agreement with the 
Smithsonian can be grouped alongside commonplace contracts for “highway 
maintenance, solid waste collection, and mail delivery.”22 The public cares that the 
goods and services delivered by McDonald’s meet basic expectations—that the 
food is of acceptable quality, that the facility is non-hazardous, and that the 
employees who work there satisfy the basic requirements of their jobs. The public 
no doubt also wants judicial recourse for torts and other private law violations 
committed by McDonald’s employees. 
Individuals hardly fret, however, over whether federal employees would make 
and serve hamburgers better or whether the Smithsonian is contractually or legally 
empowered to hold McDonald’s accountable for failing to meet expectations.23 
Although a handful of people might be interested in knowing whether the federal 
procurement process that produced the McDonald’s contract was sound,24 this 
concern is probably more theoretical than real. Food service does not involve the 
exercise of powers that conventionally belong to the federal government. The 
McDonald’s contract thus stakes out a pole on a constitutional accountability 
spectrum for federal contracts. It reflects the many federal contracts for garden-
variety goods and services that do not warrant constitutional scrutiny because they 
do not involve the outsourcing of “government” powers. 
2. Blackwater 
The infamous Blackwater Security Consulting firm, now Xe Services, is at the 
opposite pole of a constitutional accountability spectrum for private contractors. Its 
story entails the most nonroutine of government functions “that directly and 
substantially affect health, liberty, safety, and personal autonomy,”25 such as 
contracts involving national security and military operations. When such highly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. In 1846, Congress established the Smithsonian as a trust to be administered by a 
board of regents and a Secretary of the Smithsonian. H.R. 5, 28th Cong. (1846) (enacted); 20 
U.S.C. § 76b (2006). It has a congressionally funded annual budget of nearly $800 million. 
Smithsonian Fiscal Year 2011 Federal Budget Request Totals $797.6 Million, SMITHSONIAN 
NEWSDESK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://newsdesk.si.edu/releases/2011-budget?. 
 22. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 83, 106–07 (Michael W. Dowdle 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY]. 
 23. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1522 (“In my view, contracting out of support goods 
and services does not raise serious accountability issues since the source and quality of such 
goods and services are not normally something the public cares much about.”). Professor 
Freeman notes, however, that “we might demand that contractors provide universal access, 
comply with antidiscrimination norms, and put procedures in place to prevent arbitrariness in 
termination decisions,” particularly where vulnerable populations are affected (prisoners, 
welfare and Medicaid recipients, school-age children). Freeman, supra note 22, at 106–07. 
 24. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1522 (describing “contracting out” and the 
possibility of corruption in the contracting process). Opposition to the contract might also 
come from “government workers who either would lose their jobs [or] face transfer to 
different units” once the decision was made to privatize food service at this federal 
museum. Id. at 1523. 
 25. Freeman, supra note 22, at 106. 
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sensitive government functions are outsourced to private parties by contract, a 
constitutional boundary mandating at least minimal accountability becomes a 
practical imperative. 
In April of 2011, “there [we]re more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than 
there [we]re uniformed soldiers.”26 Contractors participate in a wide range of 
activities for the military, from the provision of food services and mail delivery to 
the running of active operations at the forefront of the battlefield.27 Those engaged 
in actual combat are known as military provider firms, which act like a “quasi-
military”—their personnel dress like military and are armed with sophisticated 
weaponry.28 During the troop surge in 2007, private military contractors “in Iraq 
outnumbered military personnel 180,000 to 165,000, with between 20,000 and 
30,000 contractors in quasi-military roles.”29 
Private military contractors have been linked to numerous accounts of criminal 
activity involving dead or injured civilians.30 The company now known as Xe—
which has existed as Blackwater in various corporate forms since 1997—has been 
prominently implicated in a number of them. In 2010, the Obama administration 
awarded Blackwater over a quarter of a billion dollars in contracts to work for the 
State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan and 
other global “hot zones.”31 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reportedly explained 
that, given the company’s competitive bid and unparalleled experience, “there 
really was not much choice.”32 All totaled, Blackwater has received over a billion 
dollars in federal contracts.33 Its responsibilities have included tactics and weapons 
training for military, government, and law enforcement agencies, including Navy 
SEALS;34 high-risk security details for diplomats and other officials; and protection 
of sensitive installations, including CIA offices abroad.35 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Jeff Shear, A Professional Military and the Privatization of Warfare, PAC. 
STANDARD (April 22, 2011), http://www.psmag.com/culture/a-professional-military-and-the-
privatization-of-warfare-30468. 
 27. See Katherin J. Chapman, Note, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ 
Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2010). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 1050 (citing Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused 
Jurisdictional Regime for Private Military Contractors During Contingency Operations, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (2008)). 
 30. See id. at 1051. 
 31. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater’s New Sugar Daddy: The Obama Administration, 
NATION (June 28, 2010, 11:19 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/36756/blackwaters-
new-sugar-daddy-obama-administration. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Blackwater’s Rich Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/03/opinion/03iht-edblack.1.7733227.html. 
 34. See James Dao, Attack Turns Spotlight on Private Security Firms, REGISTER-GUARD, 
Apr. 2, 2004, at A2; Blackwater Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/business/companies/blackwater_usa/index.html. 
 35. See Blackwater Worldwide, supra note 34; Mark Landler & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Still 
Using Security Firm It Broke With, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/22/us/22intel.html?ref=blackwaterusa; Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Loses a Job for the 
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/politics/12black
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The company remains under investigation by multiple federal agencies and 
Congress for a series of alleged wrongdoings, including “weapons charges, murder, 
manslaughter, conspiracy, making false statements[,] using shell companies to win 
contracts that may not have been awarded to Blackwater if the company’s true 
identity was clear,” and “violat[ing] U.S. export control regulations in Sudan, Iraq 
and elsewhere.”36 In April of 2010, five of the company’s top officials—including a 
former Blackwater president, two former vice presidents, and its former legal 
counsel—were indicted on fifteen counts of conspiracy, weapons, and obstruction 
of justice charges.37 Federal prosecutors “are still pursuing the Blackwater 
operatives alleged to be responsible for the single greatest massacre of Iraqi 
civilians by a private U.S. force, the infamous Nisour Square massacre.”38 In 2010, 
Senator Carl Levin, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, formally called 
upon the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Defense (DOD) to investigate what he 
called “‘the reckless use of weapons by Blackwater personnel and a failure by the 
company to adequately supervise its personnel’ in Afghanistan.”39 
Compounding this disquieting picture of Blackwater are the longstanding gaps 
in federal oversight of military contractors in general. A congressional investigation 
found in 2007 that, although Blackwater “charge[d] the government $1222 per day 
for each private military operative—more than six times the wage of an equivalent 
soldier,” its high tab did not keep the company from overcharging.40 An audit by 
the State Department’s inspector general in 2005 revealed, for example, that 
Blackwater was billing “separately for ‘drivers’ and ‘security specialists’ who 
were, in fact, the same people.”41 
In 2008, DOD’s inspector general released a gloomy report on the challenges in 
oversight of military contractors involved in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 and 
2007.42 The report stated that contract requirements were not met, funds were either 
inappropriately spent or missing, goods and services were either undelivered or 
unaccounted for, individuals involved in the acquisition process lacked integrity, 
and adequate documentation was not retained or prepared regarding the contracting 
process.43 Additionally, “[t]he sheer number of contracting actions and the 
pressures on contracting officials to award procurements faster ma[d]e the 
challenge of correcting the problems more difficult.”44 DOD had “limited visibility 
over contractors and contractor activity, [a] lack of adequate contract oversight 
                                                                                                                 
water.html?ref=blackwaterusa. 
 36. Scahill, supra note 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Blackwater’s Rich Contracts, supra note 33. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE DEP’T OF DEF., CHALLENGES IMPACTING 
OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM AND ENDURING FREEDOM REPORTED BY MAJOR OVERSIGHT 
ORGANIZATIONS BEGINNING FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2007 (2008), available at 
http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy08/08-086.pdf. 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Id. at 1–2. 
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personnel, limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge, and limited or 
no information on contractor support in predeployment training.”45 
Fallout over the Blackwater scandals prompted The New York Times editorial 
page to decry in 2007 “the folly of using a private force to perform military 
missions in a war zone” and the need for “[t]hese jobs . . . to be brought back into 
government hands as soon as practicable.”46 Although Secretary Panetta suggested 
that Blackwater has “shaped up [its] act,” Rep. Jan Schakowsky, chair of the House 
Intelligence Subcommittee that led classified investigations of Blackwater, called 
the company’s relationship with the federal security apparatus “just outrageous.”47 
She reportedly quipped, “What does Blackwater have to do to be determined an 
illegitimate player? . . . The CIA should not be doing business with this company 
no matter how many name changes it undergoes.”48 
As with McDonald’s employees, the public has an interest in having Blackwater 
personnel satisfy the requirements of the job—providing security details for 
diplomats, protecting U.S. installations overseas in an effective and proper manner, 
and providing federal troops the tactics and weapons training they need to execute 
their missions, for example. Much of the public would understandably expect, 
moreover, that violations of export regulations, criminal conspiracy, obstruction of 
justice, murder, weapons abuses, and even torts are brought to light and dealt 
with—just as men and women in uniform are rendered susceptible to penalties for 
violations of law committed while in service. 
The awarding of Blackwater contracts is also likely a matter of public 
importance.49 Not only do contracts involving national security and military 
operations implicate the lives and liberty of civilians, they strike at the heart of 
executive military power that the Constitution confers on the President in Article 
II.50 To the extent that Blackwater contractors exercise discretion that would 
otherwise be lodged with federal actors, the public might be interested in knowing 
that they use their discretion in a way that benefits the American public as a whole 
and not just the company, and that they are meaningfully supervised by military 
officials within the President’s supervisory chain of command who can impose 
consequences for wrongdoing. Accountability measures are not consistently 
imposed on federal contractors, however. Blackwater exemplifies the need for a 
less cavalier constitutional approach to outsourced government. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Blackwater’s Rich Contracts, supra note 33. 
 47. Scahill, supra note 31. 
 48. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. See generally Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 1, 3 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, eds., 2009) (observing 
that federal contracts have been made “literally off the books,” “awarded under suspicious 
circumstances, hurriedly and without competition,” or under terms that “are so 
underspecified as to afford contractors almost unlimited discretion”). 
 50. See John D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and 
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1006–09 (2004). 
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3. Privatizing TSA 
The third contracting scenario appears less headline-grabbing than the “worst-
case” example just described, yet it is potentially no less serious. Blackwater’s 
actions overseas affect most U.S. citizens only tangentially, if at all. But travel from 
domestic airports is an everyday occurrence. Housed within the Department of 
Homeland Security, TSA is a relatively new federal agency that employs tens of 
thousands of airport screeners, federal air marshals, and other employees.51 Since 
its inception, it has outsourced its core responsibilities to private contractors in 
several airports. 
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, President George W. 
Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),52 making the 
federal government responsible for aviation and airport security.53 Prior to ATSA, 
passenger screening was the responsibility of airlines, with the actual duties of 
operating the screening checkpoint contracted out to private firms.54 Since 9/11, 
passenger screening and inspection of baggage have been further enhanced.55 In 
2011, former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura sued TSA, alleging that airport 
screeners’ invasive pat-downs and body-imaging scans of his person constituted an 
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.56 Ventura’s suit 
spoke for many U.S. citizens frustrated with post-9/11 enhanced airport security 
practices.57 It was notable, however, that Ventura was able to identify and sue TSA 
as the federal entity accountable for alleged violations of his constitutional rights 
that occurred during that screening. 
Were Ventura to experience identical violations at the San Francisco airport 
today, he would not have a constitutional claim. San Francisco is one of 
sixteen U.S. airports for which the federal government has, since 2004,58 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. See September 11, 2011 and TSA, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/
about-tsa/september-11-2001-and-tsa. 
 52. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 
 53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SCREENER TRAINING AND 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT STRENGTHENED, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS 7 (2005), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05457.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, & Daniel H. Simon, The Impact of Post 9/11 
Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel, CORNELL UNIV. DYSON SCH. OF 
ECON., Feb. 2005, at 2. 
 56. Michael Sheridan, Jesse Ventura Files Lawsuit Against TSA, Homeland Security 
Over Body Scanners, Pat-Down Searches, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2011, 1:54 PM), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-25/news/27096713_1_body-scans-strip-search-law
suit. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the case for 
lack of jurisdiction in November 2011. Ventura v. Napolitano, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. 
Minn. 2011). 
 57. See, e.g., PLEASE REMOVE YOUR SHOES (Frederick C. Gevalt III, 2010), available at 
http://pleaseremoveyourshoesmovie.com. 
 58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: PRELIMINARY 
OBSERVATIONS ON TSA’S PROGRESS TO ALLOW AIRPORTS TO USE PRIVATE PASSENGER AND 
BAGGAGE SCREENING SERVICES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/244856.pdf. 
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approved the wholesale replacement of TSA personnel by private contractors.59 
Airports can apply to TSA to opt out of the federal program and hire their own 
screening company, and there is no apparent framework for oversight or review of 
that decision-making process.60 Yet contractors employ the same search techniques 
as TSA employees, including x-ray scans and back-of-the-hand pat-downs of 
individual passengers’ private areas, in airports at which TSA has outsourced 
security.61 
TSA’s private contractor program has run into a number of problems. According 
to the GAO, both government and private airport screening workers have failed to 
find concealed bomb components during covert checkpoint testing,62 and a number 
of reports of groping of passengers by private contractors have surfaced.63 The 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 2010 issued a report criticizing the TSA’s 
oversight of private contractors.64 In fiscal year 2009, TSA had twenty-nine 
contracts with private companies, worth $662 million.65 OIG reviewed the thirteen 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Derek Kravitz, As Outrage Over Screenings Rises, Sites Consider Replacing TSA, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2010, at A1. 
 60. See Kravitz, supra note 59; Screening Partnership Program, TRANSP. SECURITY 
ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/screening-partnership-program (last modified Dec. 
19, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions—Program, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.
tsa.gov/stakeholders/frequently-asked-questions-program (last modified Feb. 08, 2013). 
Under ATSA, the head of TSA may approve an application to outsource screening to 
“qualified” contractors if it certifies to Congress, first, that “the level of screening services 
and protection provided at the airport will be equal to or greater than the level that would be 
provided at the airport by Federal Government personnel” and, second, that the company is 
owned and controlled by a U.S. citizen. 49 U.S.C. § 44920(a)–(d). Additionally, TSA must 
provide supervisory personnel at airports, and they may fire contractors for “fail[ure] 
repeatedly to comply with any standard, regulation, directive, order, law, or contract 
applicable to the hiring or training of personnel to provide such services or to the provision 
of screening at the airport,” although airport operators have no liability for contractor errors. 
Id. § 44920 (e)–(g). There are no implementing regulations to date. 
 61.  See Frequently Asked Questions—Program, supra note 60 (“While the searches at 
the airport will be conducted by private screening companies, such searches will continue to 
be subject to the Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonableness because they are 
conducted at the instigation of the federal Government and under the authority of federal 
statutes and regulations governing air passenger screening.”). Somewhat ironically, 
Professor Verkuil observed in 2009 that the enhanced credibility of “wearing [a] badge” is 
what “helped lead Congress to make airport security personnel public officials under the 
Transportation Security Act” in the first place. Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to 
Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 49, at 310, 327. 
 62. Mike M. Ahlers & Jeanne Meserve, TSA Shuts Door on Private Airport Screening 
Program, CNN (Jan. 29, 2011, 2:07 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-29/travel/tsa.
private_1_tsa-government-screeners-screening-program?_s=PM:TRAVEL. 
 63. Elizabeth Fuller, Air Travelers Tweet: TSA Pat-Downs and Scans Evoke Humor, 
Tears, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
2010/1123/Air-travelers-tweet-TSA-pat-downs-and-scans-evoke-humor-tears. 
 64. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S 
ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS (2010) [hereinafter TSA’S ACQUISITION OF 
SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS]. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
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most lucrative contracts, which represented 92 percent, or $609 million, of the total 
amount contracted.66 It found that TSA contractors performed “inherently 
governmental functions” in contravention of the Office of Management and 
Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-76, which sets forth the President’s policy for 
outsourcing “commercial activities” to the private sector.67 Although contract 
administration is an inherently governmental function, three TSA contractors 
performed that work under contracts worth $265 million.68 In one instance, a 
contractor performed the contract oversight and invoice review for its own 
contract.69 A $10 million contract for strategic planning was so vague that it 
allowed the company to develop a system for passenger screening.70 
OIG further found that TSA did not properly oversee the companies’ 
performances. For all thirteen contracts reviewed, government files were missing 
vital paperwork, preventing TSA from monitoring whether the companies were 
performing the contracted work.71 The contractors submitted vague invoices and 
were permitted to give their own progress reports, with no independent TSA 
follow-up.72 
TSA’s heavy reliance on Lockheed Martin to perform its statutorily mandated 
functions73 has drawn particular scrutiny. In the spring of 2011, hackers penetrated 
Lockheed’s computer system in an apparent effort to obtain “security information 
that could be used to target defense secrets.”74 Lockheed also entered into a $2 
million settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over charges that it 
conspired to obtain sensitive, nonpublic information for the purpose of winning 
additional government contracts.75 Lockheed continues to perform work for TSA 
pursuant to an eight-year, $1.2 billion contract awarded in 2008 to manage its 
hiring and personnel program, with the option of expanding the contract to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-76 REVISED, at attachment A & Part 
B (2003); Verkuil, supra note 61, at 326. OMB’s role in the process has led to tensions with 
Congress over the effectiveness of private sourcing, the propriety of inherently governmental 
classifications by agencies, and the lack of sufficient federal personnel to administer the 
standards. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 126 (2007). An agency’s decision 
regarding what is “inherently governmental” is effectively not reviewable. See id.; infra 
notes 108–13 and accompanying text (discussing Circular A-76). 
 68. TSA’S ACQUISITION OF SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS, supra note 64, at 4. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 6. 
 71. See id. at 5. 
 72. See id. at 6–7. 
 73. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 74. Chloe Albanesius, RSA to Replace SecurID Tokens After Lockheed Cyber Attack, 
PCMAG.COM (June 7, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386512
,00.asp#fbid=V40ujCkx1eY; see also Lockheed Martin Hit by Computer Breach, L.A. 
TIMES, May 29, 2011, at A25; accord Mathew J. Schwartz, Lockheed Martin Suffers 
Massive Cyberattack, INFO. WK. (May 31, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.
com/news/government/security/229700151. 
 75. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Lockheed Martin to Pay $2 Million to Resolve 
Allegations Resulting from Fraudulent Submission of Government Contract, Jan. 24, 2011, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-civ-095.html. 
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over $3 billion in work.76 The contract gives Lockheed responsibility for 
undefined tasks such as “workforce planning and program and project 
management” as well as “recruitment and retention services” for TSA’s 40,000+ 
employees.77 In a letter to TSA’s administrator, the Chair of the House 
Homeland Security Committee criticized this contract for attempting to 
“‘outsource[]’ away” TSA’s personnel problems.78 
As with the Blackwater contracts, the public might be concerned that the 
TSA procurement process is sufficiently competitive and fraud-free, and that 
TSA does not overspend in comparison to what it would pay to hire federal 
employees to perform the same job. TSA’s contracts with private security 
firms raise a heightened public interest in the proper execution of the 
contracts, however, that differs from even the Blackwater example. As with 
9/11, a major screening error could lead to catastrophic consequences, including 
losses of human life. Whereas Blackwater contractors’ human rights abuses are 
more likely to occur overseas, U.S. citizens fall vulnerable to groping and 
other violations by TSA contractors operating domestically. TSA contractors 
reportedly exercise an inappropriate level of discretion with insufficient 
oversight, despite the post-9/11 national security implications of airport 
screening.79 It is therefore also a matter of deep public concern that, despite 
their private status, TSA contractors are exercising discretion with the 
interests of the U.S. citizenry at heart rather than for pure corporate profit. 
Moreover, as described below, the public’s ability to influence policy-making 
decisions involving personal privacy and transportation safety is arbitrary to the 
extent that meaningful discretion is exercised at the airport level by an unprincipled 
mix of public and private employees. These concerns are distinct from the 
question of whether travelers can enforce in court the government’s obligation 
to respect individual constitutional rights,80 and thus warrant their own 
constitutional framework for review and analysis. 
B. Legislative, Regulatory, and Judicial Nonsolutions 
As government outsourcing continues, the need to ensure proper oversight of 
private contractors becomes all the more salient.81 As with questions of the per se 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. See Elizabeth Newell Jochum, Lawmaker Raises Concerns Over Huge TSA 
Personnel Contract, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (July 18, 2008), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/
0708/071808e1.htm. For a summary of TSA’s top contractors and the dollar amounts of their 
contracts, see Nick Wakeman, Transportation Security Administration Overview, WASH. 
TECH. (Jan. 28, 2011), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2011/01/31/upfront-tsa-
agency-snapshot.aspx. 
 77. Jocuhm, supra note 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Beermann, supra note 8, at 1527–28. 
 81. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some 
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 
115, 136 (“The problem [with privatization] as many see it is that state power has been 
added without customary accountability arrangements for the use of that power.”); Paul R. 
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constitutionality of independent agencies,82 debate over whether the federal 
government should outsource is a futile exercise. It is here to stay. The more 
interesting and perhaps urgent task fixates on procedure: identifying how the 
government should structure its contractual relationships with the private sector to 
foster conformity with democratic and constitutional norms. 
One such norm is political accountability. Yet, there is an accountability 
disconnect when it comes to government-by-contract. Although one might debate 
the effectiveness of the individual mechanisms that exist for holding public actors 
accountable, as a whole the system captures numerous formal and informal checks 
in a multilayered fashion.83 Federal officers and employees are susceptible to 
statutorily mandated transparency, regularity through bureaucratic processes, 
electoral accountability at the highest, cabinet-level echelons,84 the judicial 
enforcement of the rule of law,85 market competition and correction,86 and public 
exposure through the press and the “court of public opinion.”87 The majority of 
these mechanisms do not apply to private contractors.88 
As the dominant mode of modern government, administrative bureaucracy 
incorporates a particularly complex set of accountability modalities.89 The 
administrative state is a hierarchy, with the President at the top by constitutional 
prerogative.90 Decision makers are aware that they will be held accountable to a 
                                                                                                                 
Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
397, 400–01 (2006) (discussing the private contractor “accountability gap” and suggesting 
that “inherent government functions” should be preserved for the public sector). As Paul 
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 82. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687, 696 (1988) (discussing Supreme Court 
precedent upholding the constitutionality of independent agencies); Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 485, 489 (2009) (“[A]t least since Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the constitutionality 
of independent agencies.” (citation omitted)). 
 83. See Mashaw, supra note 81, at 117–18. 
 84. But see John Braithwaite, Accountability and Responsibility Through Restorative 
Justice, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 33, 33 (“[O]ur vote is mostly not the 
accountability tool it once was.”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic 
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 
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that is, arguing against open-ended delegations by the legislature, in favor of a unitary 
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 85. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 
1401–02 (2003) (discussing the legal form of accountability through judicial review). 
 86. See Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and 
Epistemic Mappings, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 1, 3–5. 
 87. Jerry Brito & Drew Perraut, Transparency and Performance in Government, 11 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 161, 170 (2010). 
 88. See infra notes 124–42 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Rubin, supra note 84, at 74–75. 
 90. See U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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defined person or group with supervisory authority.91 Thus, “[a]n administrative 
hierarchy is frequently a chain of accountability, and the idea of accountability 
serves as an essential feature in the construction and operation of the hierarchy.”92 
Elected leaders might respond to deeply felt views of the electorate, but they are 
not obligated to justify their behavior in the same sense as someone who is 
incentivized by the direct rewards or punishments of a supervisor within “a tightly 
integrated hierarchy, such as those found within the administrative apparatus.”93 
Within the administrative hierarchy, moreover, a wide range of standards have 
been imposed on federal agencies by Congress, the President, and the courts for 
limiting the discretion exercised on behalf of the constitutional branches, and for 
imposing transparency and modes of public participation. The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)94 is the primary statutory source for public disclosure, public 
involvement in rule making, and judicial review of government decision making. 
Its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provisions mandate public disclosure of 
government activities.95 The Federal Advisory Committee Act restricts and makes 
public the advice that federal advisory committees provide agencies,96 and the 
Government in the Sunshine Act makes statutorily defined agency meetings 
public.97 The Federal Register Act requires publication of regulatory documents for 
public inspection98 and the Information Quality Act (also known as the Data 
Quality Act) directs OMB to issue government-wide “policy and procedural 
guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, 
utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal agencies.”99 This is 
far from an exhaustive statutory list. Presidential oversight is brought formally into 
the mix with Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, which require OMB oversight of 
the regulatory process100 through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA).101 And “[s]ince 1970, the courts have expanded judicial supervision of 
agencies by broadening the rules of standing, issuing more specific criteria 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See Rubin, supra note 84, at 75. 
 92. Id. at 76. 
 93. Id. at 77. But cf. Freeman, supra note 19, at 549 (arguing that there has been an 
inordinate focus on formal accountability to the three branches of government while 
aggregate accountability for private contractors—which would include contractual terms—is 
a better model). 
 94. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006); see also Metzger, supra 
note 85, at 1434 (noting that, whereas the APA applies only to agencies, regulations 
governing contractors focus on preventing fraud versus providing a way to challenge 
contractors’ actions). 
 95. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 96. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2. 
 97. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). 
 98. Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–11 (2006). 
 99. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-154 (2001). 
 100. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order No. 
12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985). 
 101. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21; see also 2 JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL 
J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.09 (2011) (describing the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
which created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
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regarding the development and use of a factual record, expanding notice and 
comment requirements, and . . . tak[ing] a ‘hard look’ at the reasonableness of 
proposed regulations.”102 Federal officers must take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution, regardless of who happens to occupy the White House.103 
In contrast, administrative law places relatively lax legal constraints on private 
contractors.104 The APA, the FOIA, and other disclosure statutes apply only to 
agencies.105 To be sure, OMB Circular A-76 forbids the outsourcing of “inherently 
governmental” functions,106 but agencies overlook its provisions,107 which eschew 
judicial review.108 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 
codifies Circular A-76’s definition of “inherently governmental function,”109 but it 
has not been construed to enable judicial review of contracting decisions, either.110 
It requires, rather, that agencies publish lists of activities performed by government 
employees that are not inherently governmental.111 Although the FAIR Act 
emphasizes competitive outsourcing, it does not provide for challenges to the 
decision to outsource itself.112 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)113 is the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated 
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 108. CIRCULAR NO. A-76 REVISED, supra note 67, at 5(g) (“Noncompliance . . . shall not 
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 110. Verkuil, supra note 81, at 452. 
 111. See 31 U.S.C. § 501(2). 
 112. See 31 U.S.C. § 501(2)(d). 
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principal set of regulations governing the process through which the government 
purchases goods and services, but only disappointed bidders have succeeded in 
challenging contract awards for noncompliance.114 Private tort and contract law 
might apply, but lawsuits are often stymied by successful contractor immunity 
defenses.115 Although the government retains contractual power to sue private 
contractors under the Contract Disputes Act,116 it may contract out of certain 
protections in the negotiating process117 or lack the resources and motivation to 
pursue common law remedies.118 The False Claims Act119 allows for qui tam suits 
to recover penalties from private contractors for fraud, but its requirements are 
difficult to satisfy.120 
Consequently, Jerry Mashaw has suggested that a “retreat from accountability” 
results when public functions are outsourced at the expense of transparency: 
“Private actors are presumptively entitled to privacy; public officials are not. 
Private actors generate ‘proprietary’ information; the information produced by 
public agencies is ‘owned’ by the public. Public actors must often give public 
reasons for their actions; private preference motivates markets.”121 Whereas 
bureaucratic accountability engages vertical hierarchies (much like a principal-
agent relationship), contractual arrangements are horizontal.122 If a contractor is in 
breach, the government stands as a party to the contract with common law remedies 
rather than as a superior with review and removal powers within an administrative 
structure. And although contract terms and private law contain a variety of 
standards for contractor behavior, such standards are not constitutionally moored, 
                                                                                                                 
Procurement Policy Act of 1974. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 401–38 (2006). 
 114. Bidders can either challenge the agency’s failure to comply with Circular A-76 
under the APA or file bid protests with the GAO under 31 U.S.C. § 3551. Robert H. Shriver 
III, No Seat at the Table: Flawed Contracting Out Process Unfairly Limits Front-Line 
Federal Employee Participation, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 613, 627 (2001) (citing CC Distribs. v. 
United States, 883 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding no constitutional standing to sue)); see 
also Verkuil, supra note 81, at 453 (“This leaves contractors themselves the most likely 
candidates to achieve judicial review and makes such review dependent upon the 
government denying rather than granting a request to privatize a government function.”); cf. 
id. at 454 (suggesting that the Subdelegation Act might provide an avenue for judicial review 
of delegations to private parties) (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 301–02 (2000)). 
 115. See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity 
to private foster care contractor in action under federal disability laws); Pani v. Empire Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to private insurance 
company in Medicare dispute); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only 
Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1216, 1228 (2008) (reviewing VERKUIL, supra note 67) 
(arguing that private contractors should not be immunized for government work performed). 
 116. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09 (2006). 
 117. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 591. 
 118. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 97–98 (explaining how both the executive and 
legislative branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable). 
 119. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006). 
 120. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT, supra note 49, at 335, 356. 
 121. Mashaw, supra note 81, at 136. 
 122. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 109–10. 
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thus placing private contractors in a less accountable posture than their public 
counterparts who might exercise identical authority.123 
C. Two Failed Constitutional Doctrines 
Although the Constitution sets forth standards that dictate how the implements 
of government are established124 and the respective roles of the tripartite 
branches,125 its text does not provide a “standard set of institutional designs that we 
recognize as responsive to the[] . . . accountability concerns” that characterize 
outsourcing today.126 Of course, the founders could not have anticipated the 
complex administrative behemoth that currently sprawls across Washington, D.C., 
or the extent to which corporate America influences government both politically 
and vicariously through the execution of government contracts. Scholars have 
attempted to retool existing constitutional doctrine to capture excesses in 
outsourcing, but these efforts have not borne fruit doctrinally. There is in all 
likelihood a practical reason for this: both the federal contracting apparatus and the 
administrative state are buttressed by current understandings of the nondelegation 
and state action doctrines. If the Supreme Court were to tinker with existing law to 
limit government outsourcing, it could jeopardize key supports for the 
administrative bureaucracy itself. 
1. Private Delegation 
Although tailor-made for confining the outsourcing of federal powers to private 
parties, the private delegation doctrine does not fulfill its constitutional potential.127 
To be sure, it serves up a promising argument against excessive privatization: that 
the powers vested by the Constitution in the respective branches must be exercised 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Public actors are also bound to respect individuals’ constitutional rights to the extent 
that their actions intersect with them. Thus, a social security recipient has a right to due 
process in the processing of her claims. Under the state action doctrine, a contractor charged 
with processing benefits would be liable for due process violations only if it qualified as a 
state actor. See infra Part I.C. This Article does not argue for the complete 
constitutionalization of federal contractors, however. It suggests that the structure of 
outsourced relationships could be designed to conform to constitutional norms without 
rendering private contractors constitutionally liable in private litigation. 
 124. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointment clause); id. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl. 2 
(bicameralism and presentment requirements); id. art. III, § 1 (clause establishing the 
Supreme Court).  
 125. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (executive vesting clause); id. art. II, § 3 (take care 
clause); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (necessary and proper clause); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (case or 
controversy clause).  
 126. Mashaw, supra note 81, at 139; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, 
Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 49, at 
291, 291 (“[C]onstitutional law has had little to say about privatization, even as privatization 
is fundamentally reshaping government.”). 
 127. See Freeman, supra note 22, at 88 (arguing that despite the nondelegation doctrine, 
Congress has the power to delegate “broad powers that afford private actors considerable 
discretion”). 
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in the precise way they are constitutionally authorized and cannot be transferred 
elsewhere.128 Such a claim featured prominently in post-New Deal litigation around 
the propriety of the burgeoning administrative state.129 In Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan,130 the Court struck down a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA)131 that empowered the President to manage a statutory prohibition on 
interstate shipment of petroleum on the grounds that Congress had set “no criterion 
to govern the President’s course.”132 
A challenge to private delegations reached the Supreme Court around the same 
time, with similar results. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,133 the Court 
famously held unconstitutional a statute that authorized the promulgation of 
regulations to govern the sale of chickens. NIRA empowered private trade and 
industrial groups to draft codes of fair competition, which were subject to the 
President’s approval.134 The Court declared the legislation a violation of the 
separation of powers, since it enabled businesses “[to] roam at will and the 
President [to] approve or disapprove their proposal as he may see fit.”135 Congress, 
the Court explained, “is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the 
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”136 With rhetorical 
flourish, the Court went on to suggest that an alternative ruling—enabling 
delegations of legislative power to private parties—would border on the 
unthinkable: 
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its 
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to 
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent 
for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? . . . The 
answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown 
to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional 
prerogatives and duties of Congress.137 
The Supreme Court long ago declined to extend the holdings in Panama 
Refining and Schechter Poultry to further confine congressional delegations of 
legislative power, concluding that Congress has broad authority to delegate so long 
as its enabling legislation includes an “intelligible principle” to guide the exercise 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation 
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system 
of Government. . . . Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another 
Branch.”). 
 129. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Metzger, supra note 85, at 1437–45 
(discussing nondelegation cases in the Supreme Court following the New Deal). 
 130. Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 388.  
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). 
 132. Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 415. 
 133. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495. 
 134. See id. at 521–53 & 521 n.4. 
 135. Id. at 538. 
 136. Id. at 529. 
 137. Id. at 537. 
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of discretion.138 In Mistretta v. United States,139 the Court explained that this 
principle “has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly 
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, 
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives.”140 “Intelligible principle” has since devolved into a toothless 
term, with the Court sustaining vague legislative instructions to act, for example, 
“in the ‘public interest.’”141 
A modern doctrinal version of nondelegation would be a tricky fix for 
privatization run amok. The argument hinges on a diligent reading of the vesting 
clauses—that the legislative branch and only the legislative branch can exercise 
legislative power, for example—and not on the public versus private status of the 
delegatee. Thus, a ban on private delegations would be difficult to fashion without 
calling into question the propriety of legislative delegations to administrative 
agencies as well. And to the extent the Justices adhere to Mistretta’s pragmatic 
approach to doctrine, they are unlikely to wade into such perilous waters. The 
private delegation doctrine is thus poorly suited for the work of setting 
constitutional limits on outsourcing.142 
2. State Action 
In theory, the state action doctrine provides an alternative mechanism for 
holding private actors constitutionally accountable for malfeasance by virtue of the 
government’s control or coercion over them. In effect, it converts private actors 
into state ones for purposes of liability for violations of individual plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); Freeman, supra note 22, at 88. 
 139. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
 140. Id. at 372. 
 141. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Nat’l Broad. 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)) (“[W]e have found an ‘intelligible principle’ in various 
statutes authorizing regulation in the ‘public interest.’”). 
 142. Justice Scalia suggested in Mistretta that “the doctrine of unconstitutional 
delegation” of legislative and policy-making power is so “essential to democratic 
government” that “[o]ur [m]embers of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all 
power to the President and adjourn sine die.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Nor, he added, could some lawmakers hand off their 
constitutional duties, such as voting on bills. See id. at 425. “By a parity of reasoning,” Paul 
Verkuil has argued, “the President cannot turn the executive power over to the Vice 
President and retire in office.” Verkuil, supra note 81, at 425. Professor Verkuil thus 
suggests that the powers exercised by principal officers who were confirmed by the Senate 
and have taken oaths to uphold the Constitution are similarly nondelegable. See id. The 
President can delegate to subordinates under the Subdelegation Act, Verkuil adds, with 
limits; he can only delegate to Officers of the United States. Id. at 426 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 
301–02 (2006)). By the same token, the statute limits the President’s ability to delegate to 
lesser officials or outside parties. See id. at 427. The Subdelegation Act notwithstanding, 
Professor Verkuil argues that “[t]he President could never claim an inherent power to 
delegate official duties to private hands.” Id. at 427–28. 
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constitutional rights.143 In Blum v. Yaretsky,144 the Supreme Court described the 
doctrine as enabling states to be held “responsible for a private decision only when 
it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, 
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
State.”145 As a means for triggering accountability, however, the test’s requirement 
of coercive state power over the private actor has it exactly backwards: It relieves 
from constitutional scrutiny altogether those contractors who exercise the most 
discretion pursuant to the least amount of government involvement or oversight.146 
Thus, the powerful contractor who exercises extensive discretion without 
government intervention evades the test for state action; this is precisely the profile 
that raises the greatest potential for unmitigated abuse. 
Moreover, courts rarely sustain state action challenges.147 The Supreme Court 
has preserved “private” status where the commingling of government and private 
functions is significant. In Blum, for example, the Court found that privately owned 
nursing homes were not state actors susceptible to due process challenge by 
disgruntled residents, even though the state “subsidized the operating and capital 
costs of the nursing homes, and paid the medical expenses of more than 90% of the 
patients.”148 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,149 the Court insulated a privately owned 
school from constitutional scrutiny over employee discharges.150 In doing so, the 
Court suggested that the school’s posture vis-à-vis the government was comparable 
to that of private contractors: 
 The school, like the nursing homes, is not fundamentally different 
from many private corporations whose business depends primarily on 
contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. See Verkuil, supra note 81, at 431 (observing that the state action doctrine 
“‘constitutionalizes’ after-the-fact delegations that amount to the exercise of public 
authority” rather than limit them in the first instance). 
 144. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
 145. Id. at 1004 (citations omitted). Gillian Metzger summarizes the state action doctrine 
as having two prongs: 
[F]irst, whether “the [challenged] deprivation . . . [was] caused by the exercise 
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed 
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible”; and second, 
whether “the party charged with the deprivation . . . [is] a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor.” 
Metzger, supra note 85, at 1412 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 
(1982) (omissions and alterations in original)). Professor Metzger notes that, because the 
first prong is easily satisfied, the key step is the second, which is “often alternatively 
characterized as determining whether ‘there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State 
and the challenged action.’” Id. at 1412 & n.149 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)). 
 146. See Metzger, supra note 85, at 1425. 
 147. See id. at 1419–21 & n.185. 
 148. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–41 (1982) (discussing Blum, 457 U.S. at 
1005). 
 149. Id. at 830. 
 150. Id. 
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government. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the 
government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in 
performing public contracts.151 
The state action doctrine’s formalist approach to the line between public and 
private leaves bare an ineluctable question: Are there any constitutional limits on 
the exercise of governmental power per se, regardless of the actor? Whereas the 
private delegation doctrine has been construed to allow virtually limitless 
legislative delegations, the state action doctrine omits analysis altogether of the 
nature of the power being exercised by a government contractor.152 As a 
consequence, prevailing constitutional doctrine places no boundaries on the federal 
government’s ability to transfer what might be considered core government 
functions to private parties in the first place. 
What results is an unsettling anomaly: “a government entity may do only what 
the law permits and prescribes; a private entity may do whatever the law does not 
forbid.”153 Although the Constitution enumerates the functions of the federal 
government, it does not indicate whether they must be carried out by federal 
employees.154 Government agencies operate under complex accountability 
bureaucracies, with the Constitution at their apex. It is largely taken for granted that 
public values such as fair process and public participation will accompany the 
exercise of governmental power. With private contractors, however, federal 
hierarchies that exist in part to preserve those values are replaced by contractual 
terms.155 No existing constitutional doctrine injects into the private exercise of 
governmental power the important norms that animate the public exercise of such 
power. 
II. ACCOUNTABILITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
This Part asserts that the Constitution is nonetheless fundamentally concerned 
with the oversight lapses outlined in Part I. It posits that public accountability for 
those who exercise the power of the people is, in fact, inherent in the document’s 
design. Properly applied, such a principle gives rise to otherwise elusive constraints 
on the manner in which public functions are outsourced to private parties. This Part 
identifies two strains of constitutional accountability—accountability to the people 
and accountability to the President—and then gives doctrinal shape to each by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. Id. at 840–41 (emphasis added). 
 152. Metzger, supra note 85, at 1370, (“Current doctrine pays little attention to whether 
the government is, in fact, delegating power to private entities to act on its behalf.”). 
 153. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATIZATION AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (2006) (citing Ronald C. Moe, The Importance of 
Public Law: New and Old Paradigms of Government Management, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 41, 41–57 (Phillip J. Cooper & Chester A. Newland eds., 1997)). 
 154. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 130 (2004) (“The 
Constitution does not tell us which of the millions of federal employees rise to the level of 
‘Officers of the United States’ whose appointments much conform to [the Appointments 
Clause].”). 
 155. Id. at 21–22. 
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deciphering the Supreme Court’s consideration of such issues in a range of 
constitutional decisions. 
A. Accountability to the People 
The smattering of available tools for surveillance of privatized activities is 
systematically inadequate, particularly as compared to the constitutional and 
statutory oversight mechanisms that bind government actors performing identical 
functions. This imbalance is problematic not just for practical reasons but also as a 
matter of constitutional theory. Although the means of implementation have varied, 
history reveals public accountability as a fundamental principle underlying the 
Constitution’s structure.156 It is a necessary corollary to the American constitutional 
premise that all governmental power flows from the people. 
1. Foundations of Accountability to the People 
The mainstream assumption that outsourcing is fundamentally a matter of 
contract law and political will overlooks a contradiction posed by one of the 
Constitution’s foundational premises. Under the Constitution, the people are the 
sole source of governing power.157 Every exercise of that power flows through—
not from—the Constitution. Accordingly, every person exercising that power 
remains ultimately and exclusively accountable to the people. Taken together, these 
bedrock procedural ideas support the intuitive conclusion that private contractors 
exercising federal power in the peoples’ name must—like their government 
counterparts—be structurally accountable.158 
a. “We the People” 
The founders believed that all governmental power should flow from the 
people.159 Having fled a tyrannical monarchy, they understandably wanted a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. In his recent book, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and 
Principles We Live By, Akhil Reed Amar elegantly argues that “no clause of the Constitution 
exists in textual isolation. We must read the document as a whole. Doing so will enable us to 
detect larger structures of meaning—rules and principles residing between the lines.” AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE 
LIVE BY 6 (2012). 
 157. See Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and 
Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563, 1586 (1997) (citing GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 550 (1969)) (“Because the 
Federalists regarded the people as ‘the only legitimate fountain of power,’ no department 
was theoretically more popular and hence more authoritative than any other.”). Furthermore, 
“by placing sovereignty in the people, both liberal theory and the Constitution make the 
political sovereign the source of delegated, not inherent, powers.” Verkuil, supra note 81, at 
4007. 
 158. See Dowdle, supra note 86, at 3 (“At its heart, the idea of public accountability 
seems to express a belief that persons with public responsibilities should be answerable to 
‘the people’ for the performance of their duties.”). 
 159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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government that not only granted its people more freedoms but also responded to 
them. The Declaration of Independence thus provides that “to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed,” and adds that “whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish 
it.”160 In Federalist No. 49, Alexander Hamilton reiterated that the people should be 
consulted whenever the structure of government is altered “[a]s the people are the 
only legitimate fountain of power.”161 He similarly emphasized in Federalist No. 78 
that “[n]o legislative act, . . . contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this 
would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is 
above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people 
themselves.”162 
Ultimately, the founders did not create a true democracy, which Madison 
defined as government in which a small group of people assemble and participate 
personally.163 The first state constitutions did establish strong legislatures that were 
structured to closely represent the people, primarily by concentrating power in the 
lower assembly.164 Most early state legislatures passed laws, appointed judges and 
governors, and amended their constitutions by statute without the threat of 
executive branch veto.165 Constituents were empowered to literally “‘instruct’ their 
representatives.”166 But this pure form of democracy was rejected by the founders 
of the Federal Constitution. Madison deemed such democracies “spectacles of 
turbulence and contention; . . . incompatible with personal security, or the rights of 
property; and . . . as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their 
deaths.”167 Early state legislatures were perceived to have been captured by “selfish 
factions and demagogic leaders” who “enacted ill-advised laws infringing rights of 
contract, property, and trial by jury” at the expense of the public good.168 
The founders instead opted for a republic, whereby power is run through a small 
number of wiser government representatives.169 When a republic extends to cover 
an extremely large population, opinions are more diverse, making it more difficult 
for a majority faction to take hold.170 In making this choice, the founders retained 
the guiding mantra that the ultimate source of the power remains with the people. It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 161. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 163. See Dowdle, supra note 86, at 4. 
 164. Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1581–82. 
 165. Id. at 1582. 
 166. Id. 
 167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 168. Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583; see also Dowdle, supra note 86, at 3–4 (noting 
early critiques of “patronage-based politics”). 
 169. The Founders offered vague definitions of the term at times. Alexander Hamilton 
defined a republic as a government that “requires that the sense of the majority should 
prevail,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009), and 
James Madison defined it as “a government in which the scheme of representation takes 
place.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 170. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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is the Constitution’s opening salvo: “WE THE PEOPLE of the United States . . . do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”171 Madison 
explained in Federalist No. 37 that “[t]he genius of republican liberty, seems to 
demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people; but 
that those intrusted [sic] with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”172 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the notion that government exercises 
only delegated powers that are channeled from the people through the 
Constitution.173 Several Justices once declared that “[t]o hold otherwise is to 
overthrow the basis of our constitutional law.”174 In its relatively recent invalidation 
of a statutory provision embedding an independent agency within an independent 
agency, the Court expressed concern that the expanding government might be 
“slip[ping] from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”175 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 356 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the Preamble’s “We the People” language reflects a “fundamental 
principle” of American government that anchors a constitutional design that is “basically 
democratic”); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement 
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Under our Constitution it is 
We The People who are sovereign. The people have the final say. The legislators are their 
spokesmen.”). 
 172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
 173. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (“[T]he Framers, 
in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly 
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not 
by States, but by the people.”); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226–27 (1920) (noting that 
“[t]he Constitution of the United States was ordained by the people,” who “grant” authority 
to Congress, and “[i]t is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to 
alter the method which the Constitution has fixed”); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 359 
(1901) (Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, & Peckham, JJ., dissenting) (“[N]o utterance of this court 
has intimated a doubt that in its operation on the people, by whom and for whom it was 
established, the national government is a government of enumerated powers, the exercise of 
which is restricted to the use of means appropriate and plainly adapted to constitutional ends, 
and which are ‘not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.’”); 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) (“The government proceeds 
directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people . . . .”); see 
also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“When any Branch acts, it is presumptively 
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (observing that the Equal Protection Clause “is an essential part of 
the concept of a government of laws and not men” and “is at the heart of Lincoln’s vision of 
‘government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Federal Government[,] 
as a whole, possesses only delegated powers. The purpose of the Constitution was not only 
to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.”). 
 174. Downes, 182 U.S. at 359. 
 175. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 
(2010). 
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b. Derivative Power 
The founders’ idea that the power flows from the people is necessarily linked to 
the understanding that those who exercise power in the people’s name must be 
accountable to them.176 The Constitution’s very structure reflects a number of 
safeguards that foster accountability.177 First, the framers established the federal 
government as one of limited and enumerated powers.178 Before the government 
can act, it must be able to trace derivative authority for its actions directly back to 
the Constitution, which was “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by the people.179 The 
Constitution grants the government specific powers, lays out its structure, and 
explains how the government will make decisions and function.180 
James Madison accordingly described the interplay between state and federal 
governments as a “compound republic” that provided “double security.”181 State 
governments were intended as separate laboratories that could be used to 
experiment with different forms of government, but the founders did not grant 
states carte blanche. The Constitution’s Guarantee Clause requires the federal 
government to ensure that states employ republican forms of government,182 and 
empowers the people of each state to create a government independent of other 
state governments and the federal government itself.183 
Second, the founders created a government of separated powers, an idea derived 
from Montesquieu.184 Rather than mixing government by social class, it would be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. As Harold Bruff has observed, “The Federalist Papers are replete with emphasis on 
the need to ensure public knowledge of accountability for particular actions.” Harold H. 
Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 
507–08 (1987) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 
1961)). 
 177. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1518 
(2002) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring concurrence of two differently 
constituted legislative houses to pass legislation); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (ensuring 
that states do not discriminate against citizens of other states); U.S. CONST. amends. I–VIII 
(limiting power of Congress to legislate in areas affecting certain individual rights)). 
 178. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 179. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action 
Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1793 (2010) (“The structural provisions of the 
Constitution embody the delegation of power from the people to their rulers and provide 
convincing evidence that the power to govern flows from the people—who, as principals, 
‘ordain[ed] and establish[ed]’ the Constitution—to the government actors to whom they 
delegated it.” (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)). 
 180. See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 179, at 1793–95. 
 181. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 182. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 183. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A 
New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 819–22 (1994). Many state 
constitutions include accountability clauses. Freeman, supra note 22, at 93. 
 184. Although the founders were influenced by the writings of multiple political thinkers, 
historians have identified Montesquieu as the most influential, particularly in matters of 
constitutional design. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on 
Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 192 
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comprised of separated powers—legislative, executive, and adjudicative—allocated 
to assemblies, a single magistrate, and judges, respectively.185 As the legislature 
posed a risk of amassing too much power, it was split into two houses “on ground 
that each House will keep the other in check.”186 They also shifted power from the 
legislature to a unitary presidency with veto power, salary protection, and 
constraints on removal.187 Unlike state magistrates, the President would be elected, 
albeit indirectly.188 The election of a single executive created a more direct line of 
accountability to the public.189 The third branch—the judiciary—would be selected 
by both the President and the Senate, rather than by just one branch.190 Thus, “each 
branch of government should have some direct or indirect democratic basis.”191 
This system of separated powers was necessary, as Madison famously stated in 
Federalist No. 51, as “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”192 Because 
the system of checks and balances made direct appeals unnecessary,193 Madison 
anticipated that government would function in a grinding fashion, through constant 
compromises, to provide the people the most security.194 
Accountability and the idea of government by the people thus operate as 
reciprocals: because the people retain the ultimate power of government, those who 
hold public power must be accountable to the populace. Likewise, in order for there 
to be accountability under our Constitution, the source of federal power—the 
people—must have some say in how it is exercised. The readiness of the populace 
to accept the Constitution itself reflects a consensus about procedure—not 
substance.195 “We the People” agreed through the Constitution on “fair terms of 
cooperation for their own sake [as] an essential social virtue.”196 Such terms 
operate to check against the illegitimate exercise of power. People accept the 
Constitution because it establishes a “specifically constituted, democratically 
deliberative lawmaking system to which all primary legal content is constantly 
                                                                                                                 
(1984); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (citing James Madison, 
Thursday, July. 19. in Convention, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 51, 56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“Montesquieu’s view that the maintenance of 
independence as between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches was a 
security for the people had [convention members’] full approval.”)). 
 185. See Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583. 
 186. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 63 (James Madison)). 
 187. Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583. 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–3; see also Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583–84. 
 189. See Bruff, supra note 176, 508. 
 190. See Flaherty, supra note 157, at 1583–84. 
 191. Id. at 1583. 
 192. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 50 (James 
Madison). 
 194. See Hans A. Linde, Who is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 709, 730 (1994) (“Madison and Wilson relied on elected representatives to defuse, to 
compromise, and, at best, to prevent the abuse of government power from motives of 
personal self-interest or majoritarian passion.”). 
 195. Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063, 1070 
(2000). 
 196. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54 (Columbia Univ. Press 1996). 
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accountable.”197 The Constitution binds generations to this way of doing 
business.198 If the Constitution were not immutable, it would be useless beyond the 
politics of the moment.199 
Moreover, the system assumes that the populace is safer if government adheres 
to principles of constitutional structure even if it is cumbersome to do so and even 
if departures from that structure seem innocuous.200 Accountability structures 
promote public access, responsiveness, sound policy, and rationality in decision 
making.201 They also serve to squelch “the potential of tyrannical use of 
government power over the people.”202 Ideally, self-interest and corruption, which 
destabilize the political system, are marginalized.203 
In sum, the Constitution sets forth a procedural framework for the definition and 
allocation of the people’s power to self-govern—one to which the populace has 
consented. When Congress or the executive branch sub-delegates their powers to a 
private party, the powers themselves do not morph into something “private”; they 
retain their fundamental character as powers derived from the people through the 
Constitution. As a consequence, the Constitution is the guiding force behind the 
exercise of any power that flows through it from the people—even if that power’s 
chain of delegation leads to private hands. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Michelman, supra note 195, at 1071. 
 198. See James O. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 307, 311 (1976). 
 199. See id. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) 
(rejecting Maryland’s attempt to tax the Second Bank of the United States and holding that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass laws not specifically enumerated 
in the Constitution). 
 200. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of 
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 65 n.11 
(1990). 
 201. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 665. The bureaucracy that enables government to act 
predictably and fairly also hampers innovation and flexibility. See David M. Lawrence, 
Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 654 (1986). 
 202. Barbara Hinkson Craig & Robert S. Gilmour, The Constitution and Accountability 
for Public Functions, 5 GOVERNANCE 46, 48 (1992) (“Ironically this fundamental purpose—
to protect the people from the tyrannous exercise of power—is the one more ignored in 
contemporary debate and analysis.”); see also Lawrence, supra note 201, at 661 (observing 
that the public accountability considerations implied by the Constitution’s structure include 
Article III’s provisions for judicial review, which protect against deprivations of due process 
and prevent private interests from dominating the exercise of public power). The Supreme 
Court has hawkishly protected against congressional attempts to aggrandize its own power. 
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–59 (1983) (invalidating a provision for a one-house 
veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act). Indeed, the anti-aggrandizement principle is 
the only real limitation on congressional power that has survived the demise of the 
nondelegation doctrine. See Craig & Gilmour, supra, at 59. 
 203. See Lawrence, supra note 201, at 661–62. 
1376 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1347 
 
2. Characteristics of Accountability to the Public 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a constitutional 
accountability doctrine, the Constitution’s procedural architecture gives rise to 
substantive criteria for the exercise of public power. Repeatedly, the starting point 
for doctrinal analysis of express constitutional provisions is an abiding respect for 
the people’s power and public accountability. Read together, these decisions reveal 
at least three definitional characteristics of constitutional accountability. The first is 
that the people’s power must be exercised on behalf of the common good and not 
out of self-interest. The second is identity transparency—the public should be clear 
on whether it is dealing with a private contractor versus a government actor. Third, 
the public should be informed of contractors’ responsibilities and performance to 
facilitate public participation in the outsourcing process.204 
a. Acting in the Public Interest 
Implicit in the concept of “We the People” is the almost moralistic assumption 
that government actors are entrusted to do the right thing on behalf of the common 
good.205 The question of whether government is “honest or corrupt . . . dedicated to 
the public good or overtaken by faction”206 was in the foreground of the founders’ 
decision to form a republic.207 This brand of government does not necessarily 
mirror public sentiments in the political sense but will champion the public interest 
even if that means alienating a dominant political faction.208 It forbears pure 
democracy in the interest of something greater. The oath of office taken by many 
federal officials—with its regular reference to protecting and defending the 
Constitution—is fashioned to instill in public actors this “sixth sense” of 
accountability that is absent from private sector contractual arrangements.209 
Mainstream due process and equal protection precedents imply such a public 
interest component of constitutional accountability to the people. The Court has 
required that an asserted government interest serves the public good, rather than 
merely private interests or biases, in order to qualify as “legitimate” under the 
rational basis test.210 Cass Sunstein has expanded this concept to identify a theory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. These factors are not necessarily exclusive. 
 205. See Mulgan, supra note 13, at 557 (discussing discourse around a public servant’s 
“inner responsibility . . . to his or her conscience or moral values”). 
 206. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A 
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 617 (1989). 
 207. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Shane, supra note 206, at 614. 
 209. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[The oath taken by Executive 
Branch officials] is a solemn undertaking, a binding of the person to the cause of 
constitutional government, an expression of the individual’s allegiance to the principles 
embodied in that document. Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government 
lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”). 
 210. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“[A] bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (omission 
in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
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of “naked preferences,” which he argues the Constitution was designed to avoid.211 
The naked preferences theory bans the “distribution of resources or opportunities to 
one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have 
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want.”212 It is a common 
theme in the doctrinal tests that have developed under “many of the most important 
clauses of the Constitution: the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities, 
equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses.”213 All of 
these constitutional provisions have been construed to filter out “discrimination 
based on an impermissible purpose.”214 
                                                                                                                 
534–35 (1973))); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 
(1985) (“[S]ome objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group,’—are not legitimate state interests” for equal protection purposes. (omission in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–
35 (finding that “a purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and 
without reference to some . . . considerations in the public interest, justify [the statute]” on 
equal protection grounds); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the 
Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 325 (2012) (observing that 
“[b]ecause the statute [in Lawrence] did not realistically advance any genuine public good, it 
was simply an arbitrary attempt to ‘demean’ adults ‘who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle’” (quoting 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))). See generally Timothy Sandefur, Insiders, 
Outsiders, and the American Dream: How Certificate of Necessity Laws Harm Our Society’s 
Value, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 381, 423 (2012) (“[E]ven the cases 
applying the most lenient level of scrutiny to government action have almost always required 
that the government serve public-oriented goals—generally referred to as the protection of 
public health, safety, and welfare—rather than for private interests.” (emphasis in original)). 
 211. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 
(1984); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 25–37 (1998). 
 212. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1689. 
 213. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 214. Id. at 1690 (footnotes omitted). Professor Sunstein explains: 
The privileges and immunities clause, for example, prohibits a state from 
preferring its citizens over outsiders unless there are perfectly valid independent 
reasons for the preference. The dormant commerce clause allows discrimination 
against interstate commerce, with its attendant costs to out-of-staters, only if the 
discrimination is a means of promoting some goal unrelated to protectionism. 
The equal protection clause allows a state to distinguish between one person 
and another only if there is a plausible connection between the distinction and a 
legitimate public purpose. The contract clause does not forbid an impairment of 
contractual obligations if the impairment is the incidental consequence of a 
generally applicable rule of conduct designed to promote legitimate 
government goals. 
Id. at 1689–90 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other scholars have 
similarly observed that the “public use” inquiry under the Takings Clause “focuses on the 
government’s actual ends—that is, the goal it was actually trying to achieve by taking 
property.” Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due 
Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 324 n.79 (2012) (emphasis in original) (citing Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478, 479–81 (2005) (“Nor would the City be allowed to 
take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to 
bestow a private benefit.”)). 
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Another way of viewing the widespread requirement that a legitimate public 
interest animate government decision making is to consider it substantive due 
process in the reverse. While substantive due process requires that government 
interference in a fundamental right be justified by a sufficient purpose, the 
government’s “right” to take actions that affect individual citizens must 
correlatively be grounded in a legitimate public purpose to be valid in the first 
instance.215 
Professor Sunstein links the naked preferences ban to the framers’ “fear that 
government power would be usurped solely to distribute wealth or opportunities to 
one group or person at the expense of another.”216 Constitutional doctrine that 
rejects naked preferences for powerful groups thus serves as “a means . . . of 
ensuring that government action results from a legitimate effort to promote the 
public good rather than from a factional takeover.”217 Moreover, “[t]he notion that 
government actions must be responsive to something other than private pressure is 
associated with the idea that politics is . . . the transcending of the different interests 
of the society in the search for the single common good.”218 The naked preferences 
theory logically flows into the idea that anyone who exercises power derived from 
the people through the Constitution, therefore, must do so pursuant to legitimate 
government purposes, which do not include pure self-interest or corporate profit. 
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,219 the Supreme Court 
expressly relied upon the normative idea of government in the public interest to 
reverse a criminal conviction for contempt. The district court entered an injunction 
pursuant to a settlement of a trademark infringement suit. After a private sting 
operation revealed a possible violation of the injunction, the court appointed the 
plaintiff’s lawyers as special counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt action, 
which resulted in a jury conviction.220 The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s 
duty to the public interest disqualified private attorneys from prosecuting a 
violation of a court order benefiting their civil client.221 Quoting its rebuke of 
prosecutorial misconduct in Berger v. United States,222 the Court declared federal 
prosecutors “the representative[s] . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”223 Because 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding statute that criminalized private homosexual 
conduct a violation of substantive due process where “[t]he Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual”). 
 216. Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1690. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1691 (citation omitted) (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 219. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
 220. See id. at 789–91. 
 221. Id. at 802–09. 
 222. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 223. Young, 481 U.S. at 803 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88). 
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the private attorneys appointed in Young were not “as disinterested as a public 
prosecutor,” 224 the Court reversed.225 
Notably, the Court was persuaded by “the potential for private interest to 
influence the discharge of public duty,”226 regardless of the facts. It found that 
“[p]ublic confidence in the disinterested conduct of [such an] official is 
essential”—particularly when “expansive powers and wide-ranging discretion” are 
involved227—and struck a sharp contrast between the motivations of government 
actors versus private ones. Whereas “[t]he government’s interest is in dispassionate 
assessment” of criminal charges, a private party might prosecute a weak case or 
turn a blind eye to a strong one if either course “promises financial or legal rewards 
for the private client.”228 In Young, therefore, the Court fashioned non-
constitutional doctrine around the policy objective of ensuring that the people’s 
power is exercised on their behalf, that is, of “hav[ing] assurance that those who 
would wield [prosecutorial] power will be guided solely by their sense of public 
responsibility for the attainment of justice.”229 
Concededly, the precise holding in Young created a “categorical rule against the 
appointment of an interested prosecutor” rather than a working doctrine of 
disinterested government.230 In New York v. United States,231 however, the Court 
applied the Tenth Amendment to similarly confine the powers of a constitutional 
branch—Congress, in that case—due to “the possibility that powerful incentives 
might lead . . . officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their 
personal interests.”232 The question in New York was whether Congress could 
legislatively commandeer a state to dispose of radioactive waste. The Court said 
no,233 in part because members of Congress had an interest in avoiding the 
“personal responsibility” they would face from constituents if they passed federal 
legislation that identified radioactive disposal sites instead.234 Under such 
circumstances, it reasoned, “[t]he interests of public officials thus may not coincide 
with the Constitution’s intergovernmental allocation of authority.”235 
Young and New York thus lend support to the idea that federal power should be 
primarily exercised in a manner that benefits the interests of the public. This 
foundational principle does not wither away simply because an executive branch 
officer or employee decides to hire a private party to perform a public function 
contractually. To the extent that a private party exercises federal powers, structural 
constraints must be in place to ensure that private interests do not trump the public 
good. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. Id. at 804. 
 225. Id. at 814. 
 226. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original). 
 227. Id. at 813. 
 228. Id. at 805. 
 229. Id. at 814 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 230. Id. 
 231. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 232. Id. at 182. 
 233. See id. at 149. 
 234. Id. at 182–83. 
 235. Id. at 183. 
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b. Identity Transparency 
A second component of accountability to the people is what one might call 
“identity transparency.” This factor is implicit in the Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence, which contains express assertions of a constitutional accountability 
principle in that context.236 More particularly, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
federal regulation of state government for confusing the public as to who to blame 
for malfeasance.237 Private contracting similarly muddles the public’s ability to 
hold political actors accountable for abuses of federal power.238 
Three cases especially support the idea that governmental powers should be 
allocated in such a way as to make clear who is responsible for actions taken on 
behalf of the people. In FERC v. Mississippi,239 Justice O’Connor dissented from 
the majority’s decision to uphold federal regulation of state utility regulatory 
agencies under the Tenth Amendment.240 She wrote at length on “the most valuable 
aspects of our federalism,” which enable citizens to hold their local utilities 
accountable for their actions.241 Unlike federal preemption, she reasoned, 
“[c]ongressional compulsion of state agencies [to carry out federal regulation] blurs 
the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their 
representatives are no longer responsive to local needs.”242 
Later, in New York and Printz v. United States,243 the Court embraced Justice 
O’Connor’s theory of accountable government transparency while striking down 
federal legislation regulating the states. As noted previously, New York involved a 
challenge to a statute requiring states either to enact legislation providing for the 
disposal of radioactive waste or take title to it. The Court found the legislation 
unconstitutional in light of the dual sovereignty principle embodied in the Tenth 
Amendment, explaining that, “where the Federal Government compels States to 
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”244 
Under the statute in question, the states “b[ore] the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”245 As a result, 
“[a]ccountability is . . . diminished.”246 New York thus indicates that government 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. See generally Beermann, supra note 8, at 1507, 1515–16 (suggesting that an 
accountability doctrine can be erected “in relatively short order” from Tenth Amendment 
cases). 
 237. Id. at 1515–16. 
 238. See id. 
 239. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 240. See generally id. at 775–97 (O’Conner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 241. Id. at 787–88. 
 242. Id. at 787. 
 243. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 244. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
 245. Id. at 169. 
 246. Id. The Court elaborated: 
[W]hile it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials 
to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political 
interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters 
for the choice of location. If a federal official is faced with the alternatives of 
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power cannot be formulated in such a way as to pass the buck, as it were, or to 
confuse the public as to who is responsible for a particular action. 
From “the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that ‘the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people,’” the Court again identified a principle of public accountability in 
Printz.247 Printz involved a constitutional challenge to the Brady handgun law, 
which required local law enforcement to conduct background checks on 
prospective handgun buyers.248 Finding no constitutional text addressing the 
propriety of congressional attempts to compel state officers to execute federal 
laws,249 the Court turned to the Constitution’s structure to “discern among its 
‘essential postulate[s]’ a principle that controls.”250 To that end, Justice Scalia 
wrote for the Court that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that a State’s 
government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.”251 The 
Brady statute allowed Congress to evade public accountability for its effects; 
Congress could take credit for “‘solving’ problems” related to handguns without 
raising federal taxes, while at the same time putting states “in the position of taking 
the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.”252 
Printz underscores that the Constitution’s structure gives rise to essential 
principles that, though not express in its text, can do real doctrinal work in 
evaluating reallocations of power. One such principle is the requirement of identity 
transparency. To the extent that a reallocation of power obscures clear lines of 
responsibility, it may unconstitutionally render the exercise of those powers 
unaccountable to the people. This element of constitutional accountability to the 
people can and should be extended to constrain the federal practice of outsourcing. 
c. Public Disclosure and Responsive Government 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence suggests a third element 
of public accountability: that those who exercise the people’s power should 
disclose information as to how that power is being exercised. Without such 
transparency, responsive and adaptive government cannot exist. Although the 
Constitution “lacks a general-purpose public access provision, a special procedure 
for enacting laws affecting public access, or an explicit obligation to pass such 
legislation,”253 the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated in First Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer 
the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. 
Id. at 182–83. 
 247. 521 U.S. at 919 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
 248. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III, IV), (s)(2) 
(2006). 
 249. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
 250. Id. at 918 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Principality of Monaco 
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)). 
 251. Id. at 920 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 168–69; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 576–77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 252. Id. at 930. 
 253. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for 
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 932 (2006); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 
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cases that it is “well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas.”254 The Court has accordingly characterized the framers’ 
intention behind the First Amendment as “assur[ing] unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”255 The ability of the people to speak and debate freely operates to ensure 
that government remains responsive and accountable to the people.256 
Repeatedly, the Court has equated First Amendment rights with the central idea 
of public accountability. In Gravel v. United States, it noted that the First 
Amendment protects not just speakers but listeners—a protection that aids public 
access to information about government and thus its ability to hold government 
accountable.257 The Court in Stromberg v. California highlighted the importance of 
“free political discussion” to democratic accountability, “to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be 
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, 
[which] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”258 In New York 
Times v. Sullivan, it noted that the First Amendment protects freedom of speech 
and dissemination of ideas that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” because 
public debate ensures that government can be changed.259 Likewise, in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,260 Justice Jackson wrote fervently 
about the First Amendment’s role in ensuring an accountable government, as 
                                                                                                                 
438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information 
within the government’s control.”). Adam Samaha observes, however, that, “[t]hree justices 
dissented [in Houchins], stressing their opposition to total denial of public access to 
information about jail operations.” Samaha, supra, at 942 n.151 (citing Houchins, 438 U.S. 
at 29–39) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 254. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[W]here a speaker 
exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients 
both. This is clear from the decided cases.”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) 
(“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment 
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64, 77 (1964) (“The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow 
of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything 
which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant.”); Samaha, supra note 253, 
at 941–42 (“One can logically read the Amendment as promoting a system of 
communication in which audiences possess interests in parity with speakers. In fact, the 
Court had long accepted listeners’ First Amendment interests. And the judiciary was 
indicating that ‘political speech’ and ‘robust’ debate on ‘public issues’ were at the core of its 
concerns.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 255. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citing a 1774 letter by the 
Continental Congress in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)); accord 
Mills, 384 U.S. at 218–19. 
 256. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Mills, 384 U.S. at 219; cf. 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640–41 (1972). 
 257. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 640–41 (quoting U.S. Senator Sam Ervin anecdotally). 
 258. 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
 259. 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Whitney v. 
California, 247 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927)). 
 260. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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“[a]uthority . . . is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by 
authority.”261 Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,262 
similarly described the origins of the First Amendment as intending to protect 
minorities against “the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,” to ensure 
broad debate, and to allow for lawful correction of government.263 Most recently, in 
Citizens United v. FEC,264 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that “[s]peech is 
an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials 
accountable to the people,” as it creates “transparency [that] enables the electorate 
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”265 
The Supreme Court has thus construed the Free Speech Clause as enabling the 
citizenry to correct government through wide-open debate. This exchange of ideas 
renders government accountable and responsive to the people. To be sure, a 
constitutional accountability doctrine should not be construed to confer private 
liability for First Amendment violations (or otherwise upend the state action 
doctrine) or to constitutionalize the FOIA in individual cases. But the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence gives some definition to what public accountability 
encompasses: the public’s ability to debate and react to how the government 
exercises power. Doctrinally, it suggests that the government’s decision to hand off 
power to private contractors, as well as the exercise and management of that power, 
must be sufficiently transparent to enable a debate of ideas that creates a responsive 
government.266 Absent minimal disclosure of information relating to the scope and 
execution of contractors’ federal responsibilities, the use of public opinion to 
correct government is frustrated. 
B. Accountability to the President 
Missing from the foregoing discussion of the meaning of constitutional 
accountability is the visceral idea that, without mechanisms for punishing 
wrongdoers, accountability cannot exist. This concept is both inherent in the 
Constitution’s structure and woven into Supreme Court case law addressing the 
constitutionality of departures from the express three-branch apparatus. Because 
they reveal themselves in connection with a distinct line of accountability—
accountability to the President—retributive systems are dealt with in this subpart, 
which goes on to specifically suggest that accountability to the President requires 
                                                                                                                 
 
 261. Id. at 641. 
 262. 274 U.S. at 357. 
 263. Id. at 375–76. 
 264. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 265. Id. at 898, 916. The Citizens United decision is controversial because the Court 
granted these rights to corporations and refused to distinguish between natural persons and 
corporations. Id. at 929–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 925–29 (Scalia, J. 
concurring) (“The Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.”). 
 266. This is not to say that matters of national security entrusted to the President must be 
made public if public contractors are involved. The argument is that public and private 
employees acting at the public’s behest should be treated similarly for purposes of fostering 
the democratic norms reflected in the First Amendment. 
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removability and a clear supervisory chain of command to the highest executive 
officeholder. 
1. Foundations of Accountability to the President 
As the majority of federal contracts involve executive branch agencies,267 the 
concept of accountability to the President is particularly salient for purposes of the 
outsourcing debate. The sources of this requirement are Article II and the more 
common democratic notion that the President’s subordinates are indirectly 
accountable to the public by virtue of the people’s ability to vote him out of office. 
a. Article II 
Article II embodies accountability to the President in several places. First, the 
term “executive Power” in Article II’s Vesting Clause implies broad presidential 
power to supervise and control the use of that power by nongovernmental actors.268 
Second, the directive that the President “take care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”269 suggests that the President must retain sufficient authority to manage a 
private party’s exercise of executive power if he is to fulfill the President’s 
constitutional obligations of executive branch fidelity to the law.270 
Third, the Appointments Clause specifies the procedure for appointing “Officers 
of the United States.”271 The President appoints principal officers “with the [a]dvice 
and [c]onsent of the Senate,” whereas Congress may empower the President alone, 
a court, or a department head to appoint inferior officers.272 As Justice Souter has 
observed, by dividing the appointment process between the President and the 
Senate, the Appointments Clause sets up a system of checks and balances that 
works to “ensure accountability.”273 The Court reinforced the accountability 
function of the Appointments Clause in Freytag v. Commissioner,274 in which it 
held that the Tax Court, although an Article I court of limited jurisdiction, is a 
“court of law” empowered to appoint special trial judges within the meaning of the 
Appointments Clause. The Court stated that “[t]he Framers understood . . . that by 
limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded it were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 267. See Verkuil, supra note 81, at 436–37. 
 268. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 270. See Shane, supra note 206, at 600–01. 
 271. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 272. Id. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, 139 (1976), the Court held that an 
appointee exercising “significant authority” pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 
officer of the United States who, unlike lesser functionaries, must be appointed in the 
manner prescribed by the Constitution. To the extent that private contractors fall within the 
scope of this definition, an Appointments Clause challenge could conceivably arise. This 
Article relies on Article II case law to develop a doctrine of constitutional accountability; 
analyzing the propriety of outsourcing under Article II per se is beyond its scope. 
 273. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 186 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 274. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
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accountable to political force and the will of the people.”275 Although the 
Constitution’s text says nothing of the President’s removal power, the Supreme 
Court has long made it clear that, for similar reasons, the President has the 
constitutional power to remove federal officers as well.276 
Fourth, although there is considerable debate over the scope of presidential 
power,277 a unitary executive theorist might point to the placement of a single 
person at the head of the Executive Branch as support for the importance of 
accountability to the President.278 In Printz, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that 
the framers insisted on a unified executive “to ensure both vigor and 
accountability,” and “[t]hat unity would be shattered, and the power of the 
President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively 
without the President as with him . . . .”279 Similarly, in his Morrison v. Olson280 
dissent, Justice Scalia assailed the majority’s upholding of the independent counsel 
law because the statute set in motion a process “that is not in the full control of 
persons ‘dependent on the people,’ and whose flaws cannot be blamed on the 
President.”281 If things went wrong with the investigation, he complained, “there 
would be no one accountable to the public to whom the blame could be assigned,” 
despite what “the Founders envisioned when they established a single Chief 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. Id. at 884. Harold Krent has further suggested that privatization undermines the 
Appointments Clause by permitting Congress to “exercise both a de facto appointment and 
removal authority” when it creates an office for contractors and designates an office holder 
extraconstitutionally. Krent, supra note 200, at 78. 
 276. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding the President has the absolute 
authority to fire a principal executive officer). The Supreme Court later upheld legislative 
restrictions on the President’s removal power. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 
(1958) (preventing President Eisenhower from removing member of War Crimes 
Commission without cause because of the quasi-judicial nature of the Commissioner’s 
duties); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding restrictions on 
President’s ability to appoint and remove members of the Federal Trade Commission). 
 277. Compare Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1241–46 (1994) (describing scholarly debate over whether Article II Vesting 
Clause requires presidential control over agencies’ discretionary authority or whether 
Congress may vest such authority in subordinate officers free from direct control of the 
President), Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 527 
(2005) (defining executive power as including the authority to oversee prosecutions), and 
David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch 
Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 309, 317–20 (1993) (arguing that executive power grants 
broad authority to steer policymaking), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20–32 (1994) (debunking the 
unitary executive theory and arguing that, historically, prosecutors were not answerable to 
the President; nor were all Departments according to the framing Congress). 
 278.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728–29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 279. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997) (citing FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton)); accord 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 495 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson)). 
 280. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 281. Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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Executive accountable to the people: the blame can be assigned to someone who 
can be punished.”282 
b. The Franchise 
Of course, Article II’s provisions for effectuating accountability to the people 
have no effect unless means exist to enforce them.283 Citizens’ ability to choose the 
President to whom they have delegated power through Article II further supports a 
requirement of constitutional accountability for those who exercise that power. 
Madison expressly associated accountability with elections in Federalist No. 52.284 
If the President abuses his executive authority, or if those whom he appoints abuse 
executive powers, the people can fire the President.285 A new President would be 
positioned to appoint officers who, at her command, would better effectuate the 
public’s intentions. The power of the franchise thus suggests that private parties 
who enter into contractual arrangements with a member of the executive branch 
must be situated within the President’s chain of command so that, if the contractors 
err, the President can take responsibility for miscreants and citizens can hold the 
chief executive accountable at the voting booth. 
2. Characteristics of Accountability to the President 
The constitutional imperative of accountability to the President has dual 
definitional parts: while the President must have the power to remove subordinates, 
subordinates must also be situated within his supervisory chain of command. These 
factors enable the President—and the citizenry through the process of electing a 
new President—to punish wrongdoing by anyone who exercises the power of the 
people, regardless of whether the actors hold private or public status. 
a. Removal 
The Court has recognized the President’s removal power as an important tool 
for effectuating control over subordinates and holding them accountable.286 It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. Id. at 731 (emphasis in original). 
 283. See id. (observing that “a single Chief Executive accountable to the people” means 
that “the blame can be assigned to someone who can be punished”). 
 284. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) (“[I]t is particularly essential that [the 
legislative branch] should have an immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy with 
the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence 
and sympathy can be effectually secured.”). 
 285. Scholars debate the meaningfulness of the electoral process. See generally Ethan J. 
Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and 
Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CAL. L. REV. 69, 86 n.81 (2012) (citing competing 
scholarship showing that “the political science discipline is not of one mind about the 
possibilities for retrospective accountability”). 
 286. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151–
55, 3164 (2010) (holding that two layers of for-cause removal is unconstitutional because 
“[t]he President[’s] . . . ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates accountable 
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stands to reason that the desire to keep a job motivates employees to comply with 
an employer’s requirements. Justice Scalia recognized this concept in Printz when 
he pondered whether the President could feasibly control those who execute the 
laws “without the power to appoint and remove.”287 In turn, employers hold their 
hires accountable through the threat of removal partly because bad performance 
reflects poorly on them. Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged this convention in 
Marbury v. Madison, noting that the President is accountable for the exercise of 
discretion that includes appointment decisions and that his subordinates are 
accountable to him.288 
Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has identified the Vesting Clause and the Take 
Care Clause as grounding the notion that the President must have the power to fire 
subordinates so he can hold them (and the public can hold him) accountable. In 
Printz, the Court emphasized that, although the Constitution empowers the 
President to execute the law, the Brady legislation “effectively transfer[red]” this 
power to state law enforcement officers “who [we]re left to implement the program 
without meaningful Presidential control.”289 Printz thus suggests that the exercise 
of executive authority must be controllable through the President’s removal power 
not just as a matter of the Appointments Clause; his ability to meet his 
constitutional obligations under the Vesting and Take Care Clauses also hinges on 
that power. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
PCAOB,290 which involved an Article II challenge to Congress’s creation of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in reaction to problems 
with the accounting industry that were brought to light after Enron’s failure.291 
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,292 which created the PCAOB, only the SEC could 
fire PCAOB members and could only do so for cause.293 Thus, if the President 
sought to control the PCAOB’s exercise of delegated authority through the threat of 
removal, the best he could do was fire SEC members for cause on the theory that 
the SEC improperly failed to fire PCAOB members for cause. 
                                                                                                                 
for their conduct—is impaired”). Scholars dispute whether the removal power actually 
serves the accountability function. See Lawson, supra note 277, at 1244 (“A presidential 
removal power, even an unlimited removal power, is . . . either constitutionally superfluous 
or constitutionally inadequate.”). 
 287. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 288. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (“By the constitution of the United States, the 
President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to 
use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and 
to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to 
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.”). 
 289. 521 U.S. at 922 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3). 
 290. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). See generally Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract 
and the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491 (2011) (discussing Free 
Enterprise Fund). 
 291. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The 
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977–78, 1007–22 
(2005) (describing the powers of the PCAOB). 
 292. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2006). 
 293. Id. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3). 
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The Court struck down the so-called “double layer of for-cause removal” 
provisions that insulated PCAOB members from presidential control,294 
“reaffirm[ing] the principle that Article II confers on the President ‘the general 
administrative control of those executing the laws.’”295 The lack of removal power, 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, denied the President the tactical 
ability to “hold the Commission fully accountable for the Board’s conduct,”296 
resulting in “a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is 
not responsible for the Board.”297 When this happens, an unconstitutional 
interference with Article II’s Vesting and Take Care Clauses occurs.298 As the 
executive power includes “the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling 
those who execute the laws,”299 the Court suggested, “the 
Constitution . . . empower[s] the President to keep [executive] officers 
accountable.”300 The power to remove private parties who exercise executive 
power, therefore, is also central to the vitality of the President’s Article II powers. 
A key distinction exists between independent agencies and private contractors, 
however. Congress’s creation of independent agencies gives rise to separation of 
powers difficulties that are not at play when the executive branch outsources its 
own powers to private parties. If the executive were to afford two levels of 
insulation to a private contractor without reserving policy-based grounds for its 
dismissal, it would not amount to a constitutional interference with executive 
power by another branch of government. The question would become whether the 
executive can abdicate its own power rather than whether Congress can statutorily 
confine the power of the executive. Yet under either scenario, Free Enterprise 
Fund’s characterization of executive power per se as including the ability to hold 
subordinates accountable identifies and gives shape to the Constitution’s normative 
expectation of accountability to the President. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 294. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164; see also id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 295. Id. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926)). 
 296. Id. at 3154. 
 297. Id. at 3153; see Jonathan H. Adler, Thoughts on Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2010, 3:25 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/28/
thoughts-on-free-enterprise-fund-v-pcaob/ (observing that “[t]he Court drew a line in the 
sand to safeguard executive power and ensure greater accountability,” as it recognized that 
“separation of powers is about protecting liberty by ensuring accountability, not about 
protecting one branch or another for its own sake”). 
 298. The majority accepted the parties’ agreement that the SEC is removable only for 
cause, despite the lack of statutory language to that effect. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 
at 3148. Incredulous, the dissent disagreed. See id. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How 
can the Court simply assume without deciding that the SEC Commissioners themselves are 
removable only ‘for cause’?” (emphasis in original)). 
 299. Id. at 3151 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789)); see also id. at 
3152 (“The landmark case of Myers v. United States reaffirmed the principle that Article II 
confers on the President ‘the general administrative control of those executing the laws.’” 
(quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164)). 
 300. Id. at 3146 (emphasis added). 
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b. Chain of Command 
Article II implies an additional characteristic of accountability to the President: 
the requirement that all those who exercise executive power fall within the 
President’s supervisory chain of command. The Court in Free Enterprise Fund 
emphasized that an “active obligation to supervise” goes along with “Article II’s 
vesting of the executive power in the President.”301 The statute also offended the 
Take Care Clause by compromising the President’s ability to maintain “the general 
administrative control of those executing the laws.”302 Without the ability to 
effectively oversee subordinates, “[t]he President is stripped of the power our 
precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute the laws—by holding his 
subordinates accountable for their conduct—is impaired.”303 
The Court thus held the statute unconstitutional for its “diffusion of power[, 
which] carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”304 This diffusion means that 
“[w]ithout a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot ‘determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious 
measures ought really to fall.’”305 This chain-of-command component of 
accountability to the President is similar to the identity transparency feature of 
accountability to the people, but it serves a slightly different purpose. Maintaining 
within the President’s chain of command all those who exercise executive power 
enables the President to address malfeasance in response to public sentiment. 
Indeed, the viability of removal authority itself is contingent on the existence of 
traceable lines of authority. The Free Enterprise Fund Court justified its decision in 
part because, if it had allowed the statute to stand, “this dispersion of responsibility 
could be multiplied” allowing officers to be “immune from Presidential oversight, 
even as they exercised power in the people’s name.”306 The freewheeling use of 
federal power is perhaps the most pernicious kind; as such, the Constitution forbids 
it. 
Free Enterprise Fund thus makes a case for identifying a stand-alone principle 
of constitutional accountability to the President to properly effectuate the power 
delegated by the people. It recognizes that the very structure of the Constitution is 
synonymous with accountability. While the President must, as a practical matter, be 
able to hold accountable those who execute the law, his power of oversight and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 301. Id. at 3154 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 302. Id. at 3152 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164); see also id. at 3147 (noting that “[t]he 
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the 
faithfulness of the officers who execute them”); id. at 3154 (“Without the ability to oversee 
the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is 
no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct”) (emphasis in original). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 3155. 
 305. Id. (quoting FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 306. Id. at 3154. Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia 
objected to the independent counsel statute’s assignment of “purely executive 
functions . . . to a person whose actions are not fully within the supervision and control of 
the President.” 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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control falls squarely within the definition of executive power. Hence, an 
outsourcing arrangement to private parties can only be constitutional if, first, the 
President retains—through removal—the ability to hold accountable private 
contractors who exercise executive power, and second, the delegation of power is 
not so disbursed that the President cannot reasonably oversee his inferiors. Absent 
this ability, the President cannot take care that the laws are faithfully executed. 
III. BUILDING AN ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution vests the power of the people in three branches of government 
and sets up a structure for ensuring that their occupants remain accountable to the 
people. There are no caveats to this architecture that would convert the President’s 
executive power into private power when delegated to private parties. The vested 
powers retain their constitutional character always and everywhere. Thus, some 
constitutional framework for the structuring of privatized government is minimally 
in order.307 
This Article has endeavored to locate a principled system for configuring federal 
outsourcing in a doctrine of constitutional accountability. Parts I and II argued that 
constitutional accountability can be derived from the procedural framework 
embedded in the Constitution, with each of the doctrine’s characteristics rooted in 
the foundational concept that all power stems from the people. 
This Part wrestles with the practical implications of a constitutional 
accountability principle. It revisits the scenarios introduced in Part I to explore how 
constitutional accountability could bring scrutiny to the structuring of outsourcing 
decisions that implicate the power to self-govern.308 It starts from the visceral 
assumption that McDonald’s does not raise constitutional accountability concerns, 
but that Blackwater and TSA do. From this crude distinction, it identifies a 
threshold question for a doctrinal framework for constitutional accountability: Is a 
contractor exercising constitutionally delegated, executive powers? If the ready 
answer is no, as in the case of McDonald’s, the inquiry ends. If the answer is yes, 
as in the cases of Blackwater and TSA contractors, the question becomes whether a 
particular contractual relationship between the government and a private contractor 
reflects sufficient indicia of accountability to satisfy constitutional concerns. 
This Part then addresses how one might inject elements of constitutional 
accountability into federal contracts like those with Blackwater or the private 
                                                                                                                 
 
 307. Jody Freeman similarly suggests a process of “publicization,” whereby private 
contractors are embraced and brought within mainstream legislative, executive, 
judicial, and social oversight norms. Freeman, supra note 22, at 83–84. 
 308. Others have made proposals for enhancing contractor accountability as well. See, 
e.g., VERKUIL, supra note 67, at 103–12, 149–50, 165–69 (suggesting that some functions 
cannot be outsourced on separation of powers and Appointments Clause grounds, that due 
process precludes delegations to private parties with conflicts of interest, that Circular A-76 
and the FAR could be amended, and that political appointees could be decreased and highly 
skilled government employees increased); Freeman, supra note 22, at 93 (reiterating that 
courts could scrutinize contracts to ensure adequate legislative supervision); Metzger, supra 
note 85, at 1456 (arguing for a flexible inquiry into whether delegations are adequately 
structured to preserve accountability). 
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companies performing airport security for TSA. It leaves for future research and 
analysis a number of important related questions, such as has how to precisely map 
the pertinent policy considerations into manageable criteria for judges, who would 
have standing to bring a suit challenging a federal outsourcing contract on 
constitutional grounds, the institutional and societal costs of a working doctrine of 
constitutional accountability, and the possible remedies for violations, including 
whether liability would attach to public actors, private actors, or both. 
A. The Trigger: Federal Executive Power 
Not all government contracts raise accountability issues of constitutional 
dimension. This subpart accordingly posits that a contract should be initially 
scrutinized for constitutional accountability if one of two triggers exist: First, a 
contract delegates to private parties executive power under the Constitution’s 
express terms, or, second, a contract affords to a private party the ability to exercise 
enforcement power in a manner that could lead to a realistic risk of interference 
with civil liberties. 
To begin with, Article II of the Constitution provides that executive power 
minimally encompasses negotiating treaties, directing troops in battle, making 
pardon decisions, and appointing “Officers.”309 Although scholars continue to 
debate the constitutionality of per se delegations of express constitutional powers, 
suffice it to say that settled doctrine leaves that debate more theoretical than real. 
As Parts I and II explain, therefore, an alternative constitutional theory for reining 
in federal outsourcing is warranted. Such a theory springs from the Constitution’s 
structure, which is based on the principle that those who exercise federal powers 
will be accountable to the people and the President. As a consequence, private 
contractors should not be empowered to exercise the President’s express 
constitutional functions unless mechanisms are in place to establish such lines of 
accountability. Put another way, if the terms of a contract effectively outsource 
Article II’s textual powers to a private party, the second element of constitutional 
accountability, discussed in the next subsection, applies. 
The other trigger for a constitutional accountability requirement arises under 
Article II’s requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”310 and the Appointments Clause’s311 specification of the processes for 
appointing federal officers. The Supreme Court has indicated that the President’s 
power “‘to enforce the[ laws] or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such 
enforcement . . . are executive functions.’”312 The power to execute the laws 
“necessarily [encompasses] power to command obedience, preserve order, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 309. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2. See generally Brown, supra note 290, at 514–15. 
 310. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
 311. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 312. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976) (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 
277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928)). But cf. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (“Our 
cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for [defining] inferior officers.”); United States 
v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878) (defining inferior officers as those who can hold 
office). 
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keep the peace.”313 The outsourcing of law enforcement powers is particularly ripe 
for application of a constitutional accountability requirement because of the related 
implications for individual civil liberties. The Supreme Court has emphasized the 
need, “in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the 
constitutional safeguards of civil liberty”—even if it interferes with the President’s 
exercise of his military prerogatives.314 The President consequently has no 
authority, for example, “to authorize unreasonable searches and seizures” in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights.315 
Before the government can empower a private contractor to exercise enforcement 
power in a manner that realistically risks interference with civil liberties, therefore, 
it must ensure that the contractor is similarly accountable to the people through the 
political system and the Office of President.316 
The three contractor scenarios introduced in Part I illustrate how the two triggers 
just outlined would operate in practice. The McDonald’s Smithsonian contract 
undoubtedly delegates none of the President’s express constitutional powers to a 
private party. Nor does it involve the enforcement of federal laws against individual 
citizens. Private parties providing other routine services for the federal 
government—such as custodial support or office supplies—do so without invoking 
law enforcement powers either. 
Blackwater’s contracts, in contrast, involve battlefield operations, which fall 
within the Constitution’s explicit enumeration of presidential powers. Even the 
brightest-line definition of executive power would thus render Blackwater 
constitutionally accountable to the President when it engages in military operations. 
The people have an interest in monitoring Blackwater’s actions relating to war and 
national security as well. Because the source of executive power is the people, 
Blackwater’s relationship with the federal government requires incidents of 
democratic accountability to them as well as to the President. 
The airport screening responsibilities of TSA contractors do not similarly 
ensnare the President’s military powers under Article II’s express terms.317 TSA 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. Cunningham v.Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 61 (1890). 
 314. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 588 (2006). 
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 316. I do not mean to advocate here for the expansion of the state action doctrine to cover 
all contractors exercising federal governance power but rather to argue that the elements of 
constitutional accountability must be in place for private actors who are in a position to 
interfere with individual civil liberties. 
 317. For providers of services that do not fit the Constitution’s textual definitions, it can 
be difficult to identify the point at which contractor activity should prompt constitutional 
review. Indeed, OMB has defined “inherently governmental function” with little practical 
success. See AAP REPORT, supra note 17, at 393 (finding that “[a]gencies must retain core 
functional capabilities that allow them to properly perform their missions and provide 
adequate oversight of agency functions performed by contractors,” that “[s]ome agencies 
have had difficulty in determining strategically which functions need to stay within 
government and those that may be performed by contractors,” and that “[t]he term 
‘Inherently Governmental’ is inconsistently applied across government agencies”); supra 
notes 67, 106–11 and accompanying text. Moreover, scholars have long debated the 
definition of executive power. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 44 (arguing that Congress cannot deny the President the power to remove 
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does, however, perform law enforcement functions. To the extent that TSA 
outsources its ability to exercise enforcement power in a manner that could lead to 
a realistic risk of interference with civil liberties, its contracts qualify for further 
constitutional scrutiny. 
After 9/11, Congress made TSA “responsible for security in all modes of 
transportation,”318 including the critical task of “day-to-day Federal security 
screening operations for passenger air transportation.”319 TSA must screen all those 
seeking to board a commercial airline flight to ensure they are not “carrying 
unlawfully a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance.”320 As 
the D.C. Circuit explained in addressing a constitutional and statutory challenge to 
TSA’s use of advanced imaging technologies, “[t]he Congress generally has left it 
to the agency to prescribe the details of the screening process, which the TSA has 
documented in a set of Standard Operating Procedures not available to the 
public.”321 TSA promulgated regulations barring passengers from entering a 
“sterile”—or departure-side—area of an airport without first complying with its 
screening procedures.322 Since 1972, such official passenger screening has included 
physical searches,323 and, increasingly, it involves full body scans with 
“backscatter” x-rays324 or radio frequency technologies.325 These technologies are 
“designed to produce a crude image of an unclothed person,” allowing the machine 
                                                                                                                 
a policy-making official for refusing to comply with any presidential order that falls within 
that officer’s statutory duty); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, 
and the Structure of Government, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25 (promoting a “policymaking” 
standard whereby Congress cannot hinder a President’s power to remove individuals for 
failure to comply with his valid policy decisions). 
 318. 49 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2006). See generally id. §§ 44901–45. 
 319. Id. § 114(e)(1). 
 320. Id. § 44902(a)(1). 
 321. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). The court found no constitutional violation but remanded the case with directions that 
TSA engage in notice and comment procedures. See id. at 10–11. The TSA began the notice 
and comment procedures in March of 2013. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging 
Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540). The 
notice and comment procedure closed on June 24, 2013. See id. 
 322. See 49 C.F.R. §1540.5 (2011) (“Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in 
the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to 
which the access generally is controlled by TSA . . . through the screening of persons and 
property.” (italics in original)); id. § 1540.107(a) (“No individual may enter a sterile area or 
board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and 
accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that 
area or aircraft under this subchapter.”). See generally M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken 
Rules: The Fourth Amendment Implications of Full-Body Scanners in Preflight Screening, 
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH.1, 5–11 (2010) (describing screening methods). 
 323. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United 
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 548–49 (1980) (describing airport strip search incident). 
 324. See Anahad O’Connor, Airport Scanners Are Safe, Government Says, N.Y. TIMES 
WELL BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/airport-
scanners-are-safe-government-says/. 
 325. See Q&A: Controversial Full-Body Scanners, CNN (Dec. 30, 2009, 12:34 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/12/30/airline.terror.scanners/index.html. 
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operator to detect dangerous objects without touching the passenger.326 Those who 
refuse a full-body screen must opt for a physical pat down if they wish to board a 
flight.327 Screening personnel are also empowered to make warrantless arrests “if 
the individual reasonably believes the individual to be arrested has committed or is 
committing a felony.”328 
In the ten years since TSA’s creation, “[p]at-down horror stories” have 
circulated widely in response to the agency’s enhanced screening procedures.329 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that in November 2010 
alone it received over 1000 complaints of travelers “feeling humiliated and 
traumatized” by the screening process,330 which has allegedly involved “gawking 
by agents,” the infliction of physical harm, and graphically disturbing stories of 
“unnecessary repeated touching of intimate areas.”331 Some people felt punished 
for refusing to submit to body scanners; one such woman missed her flight when 
the pat down agent declared the sanitary napkin she was wearing a “foreign 
object.”332 Victims’ advocates point out that “[s]exual assault survivors in 
particular may experience severe panic, anxiety, stress and confusion” during the 
screening process because of past traumas.333 The ACLU has criticized TSA for the 
civil liberties implications posed by other aspects of its passenger screening 
procedures as well, including “[p]assenger profiling” programs that rank “the 
‘trustworthiness’ of everyone who flies,” the airline “watchlist” program, and 
behavioral profiling measures reportedly used to screen would-be passengers.334 
For its part, TSA has repeatedly contracted out these screening responsibilities 
to private companies.335 In February 2012, the TSA Administrator reported to 
Congress that sixteen of the 450 airports under federal jurisdiction “have screening 
carried out by a qualified private screening company.”336 The president and chief 
                                                                                                                 
 
 326. Elec. Privacy, 653 F.3d at 3. 
 327. See id. 
 328. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(d)(2) (2006). 
 329. Jay Stanley, The TSA’s First 11 Years, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 30, 2012, 
12:21 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/tsas-first-11-
years. 
 330. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Continues to Receive Complaints About New Airport 
Screening Procedures (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security-
technology-and-liberty/aclu-continues-receive-complaints-about-new-airport-screeni. On its 
blog, TSA encourages passengers to file civil rights or civil liberties complaints if they 
believe they were mistreated by screeners. See Bob Burns, TSA’s Civil Rights and Liberties 
Program, TSA BLOG (May 2, 2012), http://blog.tsa.gov/2012/05/tsas-office-of-civil-rights-
and.html. 
 331. Passengers’ Stories of Recent Travel, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.
org/passengers-stories-recent-travel/. 
 332. See id. 
 333. Press Release, National Sexual Violence Resource Center, National Organization 
Calls for End to Invasive TSA Screening Methods (Nov. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.nsvrc.org/news/3274. 
 334. See Stanley, supra note 329. 
 335. Congress gave TSA the express statutory authority to do so. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44920(a) (2006); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 336. Screening Partnership Program: Why Is a Job-Creating, Public-Private Partnership 
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executive of Orlando Sanford International Airport reported that his airport’s 
unsuccessful request for TSA authorization to outsource screening “was motivated 
by hundreds of complaints from passengers.”337 As stand-ins for TSA, TSA 
contractors are equally positioned to exercise executive enforcement power in a 
manner that could lead to violations of individual civil liberties, such as physical 
groping and unlawful profiling. Private providers of such screening services 
should, accordingly, be just as structurally accountable to the people and the 
President as TSA agents are as a matter of constitutional law. 
Notably, private contractors may exercise government powers that are more 
properly characterized as administrative,338 legislative,339 or adjudicative,340 as well. 
                                                                                                                 
Meeting Resistance at TSA?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of John Pistole, Administrator, 
Transportation Security Administration). Administrator Pistole added that he “did not see 
any clear and substantial advantage to expanding the program.” Id. 
 337. Ron Nixon, New Law Clears the Way for Airports to Drop T.S.A. Screeners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/us/airports-
with-new-law-are-freer-to-split-from-tsa.html?_r=1&. 
 338. Administrative power includes functions such as “rulemaking, advisory opinions, 
and determinations of eligibility for [federal] funds,” which are more quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative in nature than are enforcement powers. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 
(1976). 
 339. Congress has many enumerated powers in the Constitution, including the powers of 
the House to impeach and the Senate to convict or acquit, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; 
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; the power to initiate appropriation measures, see id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; the 
Senate’s power to consent to Article II appointments and treaties, see id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the 
power to override a presidential veto, see id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; the power to create lower 
federal courts and define their jurisdiction, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 2; 
the power to declare war, see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; the power to admit new states to the 
Union, see id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; and the power to send constitutional amendments to the 
states, see id. art. V. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 5-1 (3d ed. 2000) (describing Congress’s explicit and implicit powers). Chief among these 
additional powers, of course, is the power to legislate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting 
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States”); id. art. I, § 
8, cl. 18 (empowering Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” its legislative and other powers). Congress’s investigative power 
can also be inferred from the Constitution. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976). 
For purposes of defining legislative power under an accountability doctrine, the Court’s 
nondelegation jurisprudence is instructive, but a thorough analysis of the issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) 
(reiterating that “when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress 
must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of discretion 
(emphasis in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 340. The Constitution defines judicial power as extending to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Although private contractors do not function 
as federal courts by, for example, reviewing the actions of the executive branch, see Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803), they do perform functions that are 
adjudicative within the meaning of administrative law. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and 
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1232 
(2003) (noting contractors’ role in welfare program management). The APA effectively 
defines adjudication as any action that is not a rulemaking and that, at the end of the 
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Lockheed Martin, for example, performs “surveillance and information processing 
for the CIA [and] the FBI,” trains TSA agents, produces cluster bombs and nuclear 
weapons, hires interrogators for U.S. prisons overseas, “manag[es] a private 
intelligence network in Pakistan[,] help[ed] write the Afghan constitution,”341 and 
administers welfare and social security programs on behalf of the government.342 
The trigger for constitutional accountability could thus be expanded to the extent 
that contractors exercise delegated functions that are judicial or legislative—as well 
as executive—in nature. 
It bears emphasis, in addition, that whether a function is “inherently 
governmental” within OMB’s existing definition343 may depend on a multitude of 
factors that apply to an individual contract worker, including how much latitude 
that person has to make a decision, how much power she has to bind the 
government without approval, how “extensive” the contractor’s role is in a given 
action, whether the action involves policy formation or directing federal employees, 
and whether it involves the disposition of federal property, among others.344 The 
trigger for constitutional accountability more narrowly focuses on whether a 
particular contract implicates well-defined Article II functions and law 
enforcement responsibilities that implicate individual civil liberties. Just as all 
people on the federal payroll who perform nongovernmental tasks are considered 
federal employees,345 all individuals operating under a contract that delegates 
executive power should be subject to scrutiny for constitutional accountability. A 
presumption of the requirement of accountability would thus apply to all contract 
employees where the terms of a contract delegate law enforcement responsibilities 
or other Article II powers under existing doctrinal definitions. The Supreme Court 
has probed and refined such definitions in determining the constitutionality of 
legislative schemes creating independent agencies.346 Those doctrinal templates 
should be employed here as well.347 
                                                                                                                 
administrative process, produces a “final disposition” of a matter involving a particular 
person. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)–(7) (2006). 
 341. William Hartung, Is Lockheed Martin Shadowing You?, THE NATION (Jan. 11, 
2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/157626/lockheed-martin-shadowing-you. 
 342. See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative 
Perspective, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 335, 337 (2011); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal 
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571–72 (2001). 
 343.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 344. See DEP’T OF ENERGY, GC GUIDANCE ON INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 
1–3 (2011), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/gcprod/documents/GC_Guidance_
on_Inherently_Governmental_Functions_012411.pdf. 
 345. See Stephen L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?, 
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 272 (2004) (noting that the private sector competes with the 
government for the ability to perform tasks that are not inherently governmental). 
 346. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (assessing the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute under Article II); Wiener v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (preventing President Eisenhower from removing a 
member of War Crimes Commission without cause because of the quasi-judicial nature of 
the Commissioner’s duties); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) 
(upholding restrictions on the President’s ability to remove members of the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
 347. See generally Brown, supra note 290. 
2013] “WE THE PEOPLE” 1397 
 
In sum, the first question in testing a federal outsourcing relationship for 
constitutional accountability is whether a contract delegates (1) express Article II 
power or (2) law enforcement power that presents a realistic possibility of being 
exercised in a way that interferes with civil liberties. If either trigger is satisfied, the 
next question is what kinds of accountability controls are appropriate for inclusion 
in specific contracts, a topic to which this Article now turns. 
B. Contractual Incidents of Accountability 
Where federal governance power is delegated to private parties, the second step 
in a constitutional accountability analysis would require that the contracts include 
terms reflecting adherence to the central components of accountability to the people 
and to the President. Using Blackwater and TSA contractors as examples, this 
subpart discusses how the elements of accountability could be manifested and 
enforced through the terms of federal government contracts and public disclosure 
requirements.348 
1. Accountability to the People 
Constitutional accountability to the people means at least three things: (1) that 
those who exercise the power of the people act in the public interest, (2) that their 
identities are transparent to the people, and (3) that the public has access to 
information regarding how its government is operating so that the people can effect 
change. 
For federal employees, the first criterion is normatively reflected in the choice to 
enter public service, which, for professional career employees in particular, can be 
less lucrative than private practice—sometimes substantially so. A primary 
objective of private contractors, by contrast, is to make money for their 
companies.349 Given the staying power of modern federal outsourcing, it is not an 
answer to ban federal contractors from performing all but routine goods and 
services altogether. Although private parties can bet on financially profiting from 
federal contract work, they should assume the risk that their private interests could 
be compromised when they effectively take the contractual equivalent of a federal 
oath of office. Federal contracts should thus include terms that make clear that 
contractors must serve the public interest, even at the expense of private financial 
gain.350 Although it is not immediately evident what “acting within the public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 348. Further thought must be given to the question of how courts would apply the test’s 
second element to the thousands of federal contracts that exist. As with equal protection and 
other constitutional doctrines, it may be appropriate and beneficial to develop tiers of 
scrutiny that are tied to the relative level of federal governance power delegated to a private 
contractor under step one. Cf., e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) 
(plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to gender classifications). 
 349. See Fairfax, supra note 16, at 284–86 (describing how private prosecutors may not 
serve the public interest because of competing private interests). 
 350. For a thoughtful discussion of ethics standards for government contractors, see 
generally Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial Conflicts of 
Interest in and out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. 955 (2011). 
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interest” means, in the case of both Blackwater and TSA contractors it would 
minimally forbid purely arbitrary actions and include respect for privacy, public 
safety, and civil liberties.351 Agencies should be legislatively required to provide 
guidance and oversight regarding proper public interest objectives. They might also 
employ oversight ethics boards in addition to bringing breach of contract litigation 
to help ensure that “good government” policy objectives are both meaningful and 
enforceable when it comes to private contractors. 
Second, when the federal government engages in wars that kill Americans, the 
public should know the status of the actors as private parties and who within the 
federal government is in charge of them. Federal contracts should accordingly 
mandate such disclosures in a manner that is consistent with competing national 
security considerations. Public identification of the private status of personnel 
operating under battlefield contracts could highlight the elusive distinctions 
amongst the legal protections and remedies available to federal employees and the 
private military. It would also make it harder for politicians to diffuse responsibility 
to private contractors when things go awry, leaving them more accountable to their 
constituents for the decision to outsource federal powers in the first place. 
TSA currently discloses which airports contract out screening functions,352 and 
it should make the identities of its contractors transparent to the public, as well.353 
Although McDonald’s customers at the Air and Space Museum immediately know 
they are dealing with private employees, airport travelers going through security do 
not. The San Francisco airport no doubt posts prominent signs directing travelers to 
remove shoes and place containers with fluids in plastic bags. Constitutional 
accountability might additionally require posters or videos disclosing to passengers 
that they are about to be searched by employees of a private screening company 
Passengers would thus be made aware of whom to contact or sue when they are 
mistreated, or whom to identify to the press or members of Congress in urging 
policy changes in airport security. Although such measures could complicate 
airport security in the short term as the public becomes attuned to these important 
distinctions, the resulting pushback might be necessary to prompt adjustments to 
the prevailing privatization model, which keeps the public largely in the dark until 
a catastrophe makes headlines. 
Third, the people must be made aware of how their delegated power is being 
exercised. Otherwise, they lack the most basic knowledge required to hold 
contractors accountable. For companies like Blackwater, a possible implication of a 
public disclosure element of constitutional accountability is a requirement that the 
President make public the projected use of private contractors as part of his annual 
budget request and any request to commit troops under the War Powers Resolution 
                                                                                                                 
 
 351. Public interest objectives might align with private firms’ financial goals to the extent 
that those hinge on the provision of quality security services. 
 352. See Screening Partnership Program, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.
gov/stakeholders/screening-partnership-program (describing “Screening Partnership 
Program” and providing a link to a map of participating airports). 
 353. Such information is not on TSA’s website, see id., or on the websites of all 
participating airports. See, e.g., Airport Information, LEWISTOWN MUN. AIRPORT, http://
www.lwtairport.com/airinfo.html. 
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of 1973.354 Congress would then be aware of how much spending goes to private 
contractors in the prior fiscal year, and political debate over appropriations would 
kick in as serious questions arise. Agencies would have to justify their use of 
outsourcing to an elected branch of government that is answerable to voters. 
The disclosure element of accountability to the public might further require that, 
in seeking to commit troops to war, the President announce the projected use of 
private contractors to perform functions that otherwise would be undertaken by 
military personnel. Unanticipated fallout from the stealth use of private contractors 
in Iraq and Afghanistan continues. The New York Times has reported that “[m]ore 
civilian contractors working for American companies than American soldiers died 
in Afghanistan last year for the first time during the war,” but “because many 
contractors do not comply with even the current, scanty reporting requirements, the 
true number of private contractor deaths may be far higher.”355 If the American 
public knew in advance of the Iraq and Afghan wars the extent to which private 
contractors such as Blackwater would be fighting side-by-side with U.S. soldiers, 
support for the wars or scrutiny of its progress may have taken a different tone in 
public debate. Questions surrounding the manner in which military contractors are 
hired and managed, as well as the proper scope of their responsibilities, are more 
likely to reach the public’s consciousness if they are made part of the decision to go 
to war at the outset. 
For TSA, a number of public disclosures would enhance accountability to the 
people. On its signs revealing the identities of private contractors at a particular 
airport, TSA should give notice that the legal options available in the event of a 
privacy or constitutional violation are different than they would be if TSA 
employees were responsible for the screening. TSA should also disclose data 
regarding how well private security firms are actually diverting terrorist threats as 
compared to TSA employees.356 
As a constitutional matter, a resource that is equivalent to President Obama’s 
initiative for revealing how the government is spending the stimulus money under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009357 should be implemented 
around federal contracting to enhance government and private contractor 
accountability to the public. The Act’s corresponding website, Recovery.gov, has 
an “accountability” link,358 which in turn refers viewers to agency-specific OIG 
reports regarding the management of recovery programs,359 including financials;360 
                                                                                                                 
 
 354. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2006) (providing that the President can send troops into 
action only by authorization of Congress or in the case of a national emergency). 
 355. Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1. 
 356. See Mulgan, supra note 13, at 557 (“Accountability depends on the free flow of 
appropriate information and on effective forums for discussion and cross-examination.”). 
 357. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. See generally RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov. 
 358. Accountability, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Accountability/Pages/
Accountability.aspx. 
 359. All Inspectors General Reports, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/
Accountability/inspectors/Pages/oigfindings.aspx. 
 360. Recipient Projects, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/
RecoveryData/Pages/RecipientReportedDataMap.aspx. 
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to information on actions taken to address fraud, waste and abuse;361 to information 
about so-called noncompliers, who received federal money but bypassed reporting 
requirements;362 to GAO reports on the federal and state use of recovery funds;363 
and to audits of recipients’ compliance with state and federal regulations.364 The 
site also provides a breakdown of all funding by category, including education, 
health, housing, unemployment benefits, and tax benefits.365 A master link for 
“interested citizens”366 takes users to social media sites, interactive maps with 
information on recovery awards by region, government press releases, and much 
more. Although Acquisition.gov367 is the leading public website for government 
contracting information, it contains only coded information for contractors, not lay 
citizens. According to the site, there is no central repository of federal contracting 
documents.368 A comprehensive and searchable outsourcing website should be 
created to similarly shed light on the performance of TSA contractors and the 
sufficiency of oversight, and to pressure agencies and individual contractors to 
make good decisions under scrutiny of the public eye. 
Such a website could be managed by a federal contracting analogue to OIRA, a 
division of OMB that was established by Congress in 1980369 to oversee the 
regulatory process and to coordinate administrative policy for the President.370 
Although theoretically controversial,371 this now-established form of presidential 
oversight draws a direct line of accountability between regulatory decision making 
and the President himself. An “OPRA” or Office of Privatization Review 
Assessment would accordingly serve to tighten the linkages between those who 
exercise federal powers and the President. In striking down the portion of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that constrained the SEC’s removal of PCAOB members to a 
finding of cause, the Court made such a structural adjustment in Free Enterprise 
Fund—one borne out of concern over the degrees of separation between the 
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exercise of executive authority and the President versus an objection to the kind of 
authority delegated to the PCAOB under the statute. 
2. Accountability to the President 
Constitutional accountability also requires external accountability to the 
President, which is reflected in the removal power and the executive chain of 
command. As things currently stand, a citizen who is concerned over Blackwater’s 
use of government power has no democratically tethered means of effecting 
change. Although the FAR provides for termination of federal contracts for 
convenience or default,372 the law should recognize that Blackwater and TSA 
contractors cannot constitutionally escape presidential at-will removal—or its 
implications—if they are to exercise federal powers.373 In particular, the 
relationship between the people and private actors who exercise government power 
must be made less attenuated under the terms of federal contracts. 
Perhaps the most obvious way to do this is to mandate broad presidential at-will 
removal clauses in every federal contract. If the public is made aware of this 
ubiquitous requirement, and the President fails to exercise it in connection with 
particular contractor abuses of the public trust, the people can hold the President 
accountable at the ballot box. Thus, if Blackwater were to overcharge taxpayers, 
violate export regulations, or fail to adequately train employees on the public 
interest objectives that govern the exercise of their delegated authority, the 
President or his subordinates could terminate the contract immediately. 
Accountability to the President would likewise require that TSA include 
presidential at-will removal provisions in its contracts with private screening 
companies. 
The second element of constitutional accountability to the President—an 
effective chain of command—might further require that Blackwater and TSA 
contracts involving federal governance power be signed by a principal or inferior 
officer within the President’s close chain of command and that the officer retain 
sufficient oversight to make informed termination and removal decisions, as 
necessary, at the President’s behest. What sufficient oversight means—and whether 
constitutional accountability requires that the federal bureaucracy be expanded for 
this purpose despite a tight budgetary environment—are significant issues,374 but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 372. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.101(a) (2011). 
 373. Although members of independent agencies are generally removable only for cause, 
such limitations are the result of bicameralism and presentment through the legislature and 
have no evident place in public/private contracting relationships executed by individuals 
within the executive branch who lack the constitutional power to fashion federal agencies 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 735 (2008). 
 374. Nor is the government given incentive to rigorously review Blackwater’s actions to 
the extent that it is uniquely capable of rapidly providing the military with a resource it 
cannot produce on its own—experienced veterans of the Special Forces, complete with 
security clearances. See Scahill, supra note 31 (“Blackwater has been involved with so many 
sensitive operations for a decade and knows where the bodies are buried and who buried 
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they do not undermine the need to ensure that contractors fall in line with the 
President. 
In effect, this tightening of the chain of command between the President and his 
subordinates is what the Supreme Court accomplished in Free Enterprise Fund.375 
By invalidating the double for-cause provision from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Court narrowed the linkage between the President’s democratic constituency and 
those at the PCAOB who exercise the people’s power.376 The Court characterized 
its ruling as facilitating administrative control, the duty to supervise, and 
accountability to the President.377 Technically, the holding in Free Enterprise Fund 
would only apply to the few contractors that could be characterized as “officers” 
within the meaning of Article II.378 But as a practical matter, the PCOAB is now 
positioned alongside any other SEC “employee” susceptible to termination by an 
entity that is only one step removed from the President.379 One implication of the 
ruling is that federal powers must be configured in a way that enables the citizenry 
to prompt change through public pressure on the President. If contracts delegating 
military powers to Blackwater are executed by federal employees who are situated 
many layers below the President within the deep federal bureaucracy, the 
President’s supervisory power is frustrated in much the same way as it was with 
respect to the PCAOB. 
                                                                                                                 
them. Those are not the kind of people you simply cut loose without fear of consequences.”). 
 375. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 376. The efficacy of the President’s power to influence the SEC through the threat of for-
cause removal is subject to debate. Compare Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2011) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s finding that there was “the 
availability of practical methods of presidential influence over the SEC and the Board other 
than removal or the threat of removal”), with Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: 
Narrow Separation-of-Powers Ruling Illustrates that the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-
Business,” CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2009–10, at 269, 275 (“[T]he president has more influence 
over the SEC’s chairman than he does over other commissioners. For example, the president 
can reassign at will which commissioner acts as chairman, but he cannot remove a 
commissioner from the commission without cause.”). 
 377. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153–54. 
 378. The plaintiffs argued that PCAOB members were principal officers who must be 
appointed by the President or, alternatively, that even if the PCAOB members were inferior 
officers, their appointment by the SEC would be unconstitutional as the SEC was not a 
department and its commissioners were not collectively a “department head” under Article 
II. Id. at 3149. 
 379. The D.C. Circuit applied Free Enterprise Fund in declaring unconstitutional 
Congress’s grant of power to Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs), who are appointed to 
staggered six-year terms by the Librarian of Congress and empowered to establish licensing 
terms and rates of royalty payments for webcasting. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1334–35 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court found that the 
CRJs were principal officers under Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), because 
they are not subject to significant supervisory constraints, Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 
1339, they are removable by the Librarian only for misconduct or neglect of duty, id. at 1340 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 802(i) (2006)), and their rate determinations “are not reversible or 
correctable by any other officer or entity within the executive branch,” id. The court 
therefore invalidated and severed the restrictions on the Librarian’s ability to remove the 
CRJs to “eliminate[] the Appointments Clause violation,” consistent with Free Enterprise 
Fund. See id. at 1340–41. 
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To be sure, there are a number of hurdles that a constitutional accountability 
doctrine presents. The precise details of what must be included in federal contracts 
to satisfy an accountability doctrine are not immediately apparent and would have 
to be developed through litigation or legislation, which takes time. Moreover, with 
further transparency, the public might make demands for insourcing, which could 
lead to increases in the number of federal employees exclusively taking on the 
more sensitive of government functions. But if outsourcing is to have any 
limitations, some lines must be drawn. Under current law, there is no constitutional 
doctrine that can feasibly operate to define one. Constitutional accountability—
rooted in the unassailable premise that all power stems from the people who 
ultimately oversee its exercise—could provide a way out of a dilemma that 
otherwise shows no sign of abating. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional accountability stems from the foundational concept that the 
power of government flows from the people through the Constitution. That power 
retains its constitutional character even if a federal actor happens to sign a contract 
empowering private parties to exercise such power. Accordingly, accountability to 
the people is an ineluctable component of any exercise of federal power, regardless 
of whether public or private actors are involved. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reinforced these principles doctrinally, sending a powerful message about the 
baseline limits on the outsourcing of federal power. This Article identified some 
features of public accountability that are implicit in the Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence that might operate to narrow the current gulf that exists between 
private parties exercising federal power and the source of such power: the people 
themselves. Recognition of a constitutional accountability doctrine would enable 
courts, legislators, and the executive branch to proactively design and structure 
public-private relationships to conform to constitutional minima where there exist 
no established means for systematically managing the entrenched but unbounded 
practice of privatizing federal power. 
Just as there is no magic bullet for making federal actors accountable to the 
populace, there is no single remedy for the accountability problem with 
outsourcing. The mechanisms for keeping government workers accountable are 
nuanced and complex—a tapestry that is greater than the sum of any one of its 
parts. A constitutional accountability approach to privatization would not 
comprehensively solve the problem of unaccountable contractors, but it lays the 
groundwork for creating an infrastructure from which a similar network of controls 
might arise. If just one seminal case were to reach the Supreme Court, application 
of the concepts set forth in Free Enterprise Fund to the privatization context would 
prompt outsourcing agencies to begin shaping their behavior around a 
constitutional accountability norm. In turn, the culture surrounding privatization 
could change, giving rise to more narrow and established rules and practices around 
the decision to delegate in the first place. With broader dialogue and analysis, the 
normative payoffs that constitutional accountability implicates will only be 
revealed further. 
  
